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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC INSITUTIONS AND POLICY OUTCOMES 
BY  
VLADIMIR FLEURIMOND 
August 2015 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the impact of democratic 
institutions on policy outcomes. The first essay investigates the impact of direct democracy on 
redistribution, tax progressivity and income inequality in the American states from 1984 to 2005. 
Currently available in 24 states, the statewide initiative allows citizens to directly influence 
policy outcomes. Theoretically, how this political institution impacts inequality and 
redistribution is ambiguous. Using a pooled OLS specification, I have found that direct 
democracy leads to an increase in income inequality and a decrease in state tax burden, with no 
effect on tax progressivity and only modest effect on expenditure redistribution. However, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using a Correlated Random Effects model, I have found 
that direct democracy leads to an increase in marginal and average tax rates, with no effect on 
state tax burden.   In their entirety, the findings of this essay underscore that the way in which 
direct democracy impacts redistribution and inequality is quite complex.  
This second essay examines the extent to which fiscal spillovers exist in county 
governments in California. At the county level in California, many fiscal decisions are made 
 
 
through the use of tax and expenditure referenda. Extant theory suggests that expenditures and 
revenues of neighboring jurisdictions are interdependent. That is, neighboring jurisdictions 
incorporate their neighbors’ fiscal choices into their own fiscal decisions. Using spatial 
econometric analysis and a novel dataset of county expenditures and revenues from 2003 to 
2013, I have found strong evidence of fiscal spillovers in California counties. That is, counties 
respond to what their neighbors do.  
 The third essay examines the impact of state-mandated alternative education programs 
for expelled and suspended students on juvenile crime.  From 1987 to 2010, fourteen states 
adopted policies designed to reduce time students spend out of school as punishment by 
mandating that school districts establish alternative education programs to serve expelled and 
suspended students. Using difference-in-differences and event study methodologies, I estimate 
the impact of the state mandate on juvenile crime, finding that state-level juvenile homicide 
offending rates for black youth aged 12-17 significantly decrease after the implementation of 
those programs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation seeks to highlight the importance of democratic institutions for policy 
outcomes. Since as far back as one can remember, there has always been a debate about which 
forms of government best serve the interests of its citizens.  The two forms of government that 
are at the center of this dissertation are representative democracy and direct democracy. More 
specifically, the first two chapters link the institution of direct democracy to fiscal outcomes; the 
last chapter broadly links “democratic institutions” to education outcomes at the state level in the 
U.S. 
In the first chapter, I contribute to the existing literature on the impact of direct 
democracy on policy outcomes in at least the following three important ways. First, I measure 
the impact of direct democracy on redistribution with respect to the composition of government 
expenditures, with particular interest in the share of government expenditures on four 
redistributive proxies (education, health, hospital and public welfare).   Second, I measure the 
impact of direct democracy on income inequality using five measures of income inequality from 
a newly available panel dataset of state income inequality. Third, I analyze how this political 
institution impact state tax systems, measuring its effect  on state marginal and average tax 
progressivity  and tax burden. In a nutshell, I examine the fiscal incidence of the adoption of the 
statewide initiative.  
Indeed, twenty-four (24) states in the U.S. allow citizens to directly impact policy 
outcomes through the use of the initiative process, or direct democracy, by collecting a required 
number of signatures from registered voters  for a piece of legislation to be placed on the ballot 
to the entire electorate for a vote.  
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Using state-level data from 1984 to 2005, the weight of the evidence suggests that the 
adoption of the statewide initiative measure has led to an increase in income inequality and 
modest impact of expenditure and revenue redistribution, with no effect on tax progressivity. 
However, I have found a strong effect of direct democracy on state tax burdens. Controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity using a Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model, the adoption of the 
statewide initiative has led to an increase in both marginal and average tax rates, a decrease in 
education expenditures. Further, using the CRE, the effects of direct democracy on income 
inequality and state tax burden are modest. 
The second chapter attempts to explore the extent to which fiscal spillovers exist in a 
direct democracy context analyzing government expenditures and revenues at the county level in 
California. I add to the existing literature using a novel dataset of revenue and expenditure 
categories for all 58 California counties from 2003 to 2013. 
In general, there are several dimensions by which counties might respond to what their 
neighbors do.  First, strategic interactions might take place due to expenditure and revenue 
mimicking, whereby counties simply imitate the expenditure and revenue patterns of their 
neighbors. The second dimension relates to Yardstick competition, as citizens or voters take into 
account fiscal choices in neighboring jurisdictions in judging their elected officials. Third, due to 
spillover benefits or externalities, government spending and revenues in a county might spread to 
neighboring counties. 
Using five categories of county expenditures (general, health, public facilities, public 
protection, and public assistance) and three categories of revenues (sales tax, other taxes and 
transient tax), I have found strong evidence of fiscal spillovers across all categories of spending 
and revenues, except for health and public assistance expenditures. That health and public 
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assistance expenditures do not exhibit spillover effects can be explained by the fact that they are 
generally determined at the state level, not at the county level. The policy implications of the 
findings of this essay are generally related with the relationship between state governments and 
local governments in the U.S. In general, state governments are heavily involved in local 
education spending. There are likely to be benefit spillovers related to education expenditures, 
and therefore substitution effects with respect to other expenditure categories in the public 
budget.  Also, specific to California, the state has a heavy influence on local revenues through 
the property tax, state policy makers should be mindful that local governments interact with one 
another along other revenue dimensions. 
The third chapter, too, is broadly related to the impact of democratic institutions. Indeed, 
that states have plenary power to determine their own education policies originated from the 10th 
amendment of the U.S.  Constitution. As a result, there is a wide variety of education policies 
across states, and this has given rise to a wide variety of policy outcomes as well. This paper 
examines the impact of state-mandated alternative education programs for expelled and 
suspended students on juvenile crime.  The Gun-Free School Zones Act (1994), passed by 
congress to prevent gun violence in schools, has led school districts to implement various zero 
tolerance policy laws, allowing schools to expulse and suspend students for various school 
violations, even for first-time and minor school transgressions.   
From 1987 to 2010, several states have taken steps to lessen time students spend out of 
school as punishment by mandating that school systems or school districts establish alternative 
education programs to serve expelled and suspended students. Proponents of those programs 
have argued that they help prevent the so-called movement from school-to-prison-pipeline, 
whereby students that are expelled or suspended from schools find themselves entangled in the 
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juvenile justice system. Theoretical considerations regarding the link between contemporaneous 
schooling and crime are ambiguous. Hence, following a well-developed empirical economics 
literature that links time students spend out of school to criminal activities, I estimate the impact 
of the state mandate on juvenile crime. Using difference-in-differences and event-study 
methodologies, I conclude that there is a negative impact of state-mandated alternative education 
programs for expelled and suspended students on county-level juvenile arrests. The findings 
might be due to, among other explanations, the incapacitation and the human capital 
accumulation effects of contemporaneous schooling.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Chapter I Direct Democracy, Redistribution, Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality: 
Evidence from U.S. States 
 
I. Introduction  
At least two facts stand out about income inequality in the U.S.: Over the last few 
decades, there has been a pronounced increase in income inequality in the United States (Piketty 
and Saez 2003). “Income inequality and relative poverty in the US are among the highest in the 
OECD and have significantly increased over the last four decades (Denk et al. 2013, p. 
2).”However, this increase in income inequality does not seem to translate into much support for 
redistributive policies as the median voter theorem would predict. In this essay, I explore an 
alternative explanation to this puzzle by investigating the possible influence of the political 
structure in states within the U.S., as there is extensive evidence that political institutions matter 
for a variety of policy outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; Persson and Tabellini 
2003, 2004, and 2006, Acemoglu et al. 2013).  
Most academic discussions in the U.S. regarding redistribution and income inequality 
have taken place at the federal level. Yet, there is evidence that states do engage in redistribution, 
as there is substantial variation across states with respect to both revenue and expenditure 
redistribution (Chernick 2010). Gordon and Cullen (2012) provide theoretical evidence that in a 
federal system of similar to the U.S., lower level of governments such as states will engage in 
some form of redistribution despite a high degree of cross state mobility.  
In this first dissertation chapter, I contribute to the existing literature on the impact of 
direct democracy on policy outcomes in at least the following two important ways. First, I 
measure the impact of direct democracy on redistribution with respect to the composition of 
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government expenditures, with particular interest in the share of government expenditures on 
four redistributive proxies (education, health, hospital and public welfare).   Second, I measure 
the impact of direct democracy on income inequality using five measures of income inequality 
from a newly available panel dataset of state income inequality and state tax progressivity. 
Following Feld, Fisher and Kirchgässner (2010) who estimate the impact of direct democracy in 
Swiss cantons on income redistribution and welfare expenditures, I estimate separate equations 
for all the outcome variables: expenditure redistribution, revenue redistribution, tax progressivity 
and income inequality.  
Twenty-four (24) states in the U.S. allow citizens to directly impact policy outcomes 
through the use of the initiative process, or direct democracy, by collecting a required number of 
signatures from registered voters  for a piece of legislation to be placed on the ballot to the entire 
electorate for a vote. Following a long line of research that has examined the impact of this 
institution on a variety of policy outcomes, I empirically investigate the possible influence of this 
specific political institution on expenditure redistribution and income inequality. The question I 
ask is the following:  Is there any systematic difference in expenditure redistribution, income 
inequality and tax progressivity across states due to the institution of direct democracy?  In other 
words, what is the economic incidence of the statewide initiative measure?  
Some of the policy outcomes of this institutional feature have been well documented, 
mostly in the U.S. and in Switzerland. To preview some of the empirical literature, direct 
democracy lowers overall government spending in states in the U.S. and in Swiss cantons 
(Matsusaka 1995; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001; Matsusaka 2004, 2005). However, there are 
some dissenters, such as Zax (1989) who finds no effect of direct democracy on the level of 
government expenditures with respect to local governments in the U.S., and, notably, Marschall 
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and Ruhil (2005) who find direct democracy to lead to an increase in per capita expenditures and 
revenues at the state level in the U.S. from 1960 to 1990.  Feld and Kirchgassner (2001) find a 
negative effect of direct democracy on government spending in local Swiss cantons. Farnham 
(1989) provides evidence of no effect of direct democracy on general expenditure level with 
respect to local governments in the U.S.   
There is also a well-developed theoretical literature on the mechanisms though which 
direct democracy affects fiscal outcomes at the state level in the U.S., as there is a lack of 
observable campaign initiatives directly related to expenditure and tax issues to explain why 
initiative and non-initiative states have different fiscal outcomes. This lack of observable 
campaign initiatives suggests that the underlying political structure between initiative and non-
initiative states leads to different fiscal outcomes. To preview the main line of argument of the 
theoretical literature, differences in fiscal outcomes between initiative and non-initiative states 
are attributed, not to specific ballot measures, but to the presence of the initiative measure itself, 
by influencing the behavior of state legislature. 
There is a large public economics literature that has investigated the subject of 
redistribution at the state level in the U.S.  For example, recently, Lutz et al. (2014) find that 
there is substantial cross-state variation in the extent to which state tax policies impact the 
income distribution. Ashby and Sobel (2007) link economic freedom to income inequality at the 
state level in the U.S. However, in the context of direct democracy, this essay is closely related 
to the following three papers that directly examine the redistributive impact of direct democracy: 
Feld, Fisher and Kirchgässner (2010) estimate the impact of direct democracy on welfare 
expenditure and income redistribution using pre and post-tax Gini coefficients in local Swiss 
cantons, finding that direct democracy is associated with less redistribution. In the U.S., Berry 
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(2009) suggests that direct democracy leads to a reduction in state aid to school districts for 
elementary and secondary education, therefore leading to higher levels of inequality across 
districts in per pupil spending. In addition, Hinnerich and Pettersson‐Lidbom (2014, p. 961) find 
“that direct democracies spend 40–60 percent less on public welfare. Our interpretation is that 
direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the 
elite's potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after 
democratization.”  
Admittedly, there is no consensus on a standard way to measure redistribution and 
income inequality. For example, using cross-county data, Acemoglu et al. (2013) investigate the 
impact of democracy on redistribution using total tax revenues as a share of GDP. Some studies 
measure redistribution from the spending side of the budget, such as education as a share of GDP 
or total government expenditures. Further, arguments have been made regarding the possible 
relationship between inequality and tax progressivity. Unfortunately, this is not the venue to 
weigh the pros and cons of different measures of redistribution and income inequality. Therefore, 
in what follows, I look at different measures of redistribution, tax progressivity and income 
inequality and consider the totality of the evidence. 
In this vein, the overall findings of this dissertation chapter provide strong evidence 
indicating that the initiative measure leads to an increase in income inequality and a decrease in 
state tax burden. With respect to average and marginal tax rates, I find no significant effect of the 
statewide initiative, though the point estimates are negative across several econometric 
specifications. In addition, the adoption of the statewide initiative has had a small and negative 
impact on expenditure redistribution. As a whole, these results are largely in line with the few 
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studies that examine the economic incidence of direct democracy, such as Berry (2009), Felds et 
al. (2010), Hinnerich and Pettersson‐Lidbom (2014). 
This essay has several policy implications. First, even the most casual observer of the 
political process in the U.S.  would notice the flurry recent news-related articles regarding the 
pronounced increase in income inequality. Second, some very recent studies have sought to 
explain why there is no increase in demand for redistribution associated with the increase in 
income inequality (Kuziemko et al. 2013, Ashok et al. 2015). This study is a modest contribution 
to this debate, and, that political institutions at the state level in the U.S. seem to have an impact 
on redistribution, tax and inequality is a finding that needs to be considered in the larger income 
inequality debate in the U.S.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I present historical and 
institutional background information on direct democracy at the state level in the U.S. Then, I 
review the literature. Section IV presents the conceptual framework. Section V describes the data 
and specifies the empirical methodology. Section VI presents the results. The last section 
concludes and discusses the results.  
 
II. History and Background  
“Direct democracy” is defined as a form of government that allows citizens to make laws. 
At the federal level in the U.S., citizen law-making is not allowed. At the state level, however, 
twenty four (24) states currently have the initiative measure. This relatively “old” institution took 
root in the American progressive movement in the late 1890s to early 1920s in order to 
counteract legislative decisions and state government corruption. The last state to have adopted 
this institution is Mississippi in 1992. South Dakota is the first state to have adopted the initiative 
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process in 1898, followed by Utah in 1900 and Oregon in1902. As of 1918, 19 states have 
adopted the initiative measure. From 1904 to 2012, Oregon has been the leader in initiative use 
with 363 initiatives placed on the ballot, followed by California with 352, Colorado with 288, 
North Dakota with 183, and Arizona with 165.Why states that have the initiative measure have 
not removed it is an open and interesting question. I am not aware that it has been addressed in 
the literature.  
I shall briefly distinguish between three forms of direct democracy:  referendum, direct 
initiative and indirect initiative. In a referendum, the state legislature enacts a law, which is 
submitted to voters’ approval. In the direct initiative process, a citizen or  a group of citizens 
drafts a piece of legislation, collects a required number of signatures from registered voters and 
places the piece of legislation on the ballot to the electorate for a vote. In the indirect initiative 
process, the piece of legislation goes to the state legislature. If the state legislature fails to take 
action, the piece of legislation is then presented to the electorate for a final vote. As is often the 
case in the direct democracy literature, the main focus of this paper is on the direct initiative 
process, as it allows the citizens to completely bypass the state legislature. I am not aware of any 
paper that empirical investigates the possible impact of the other two types of institution on 
policy outcomes. This might be a worthwhile exercise. 
The direct initiative process possesses certain basic features that are the same across 
states such as preliminary filings with a state official, compliance with rules and laws, collection 
of a number of signatures from registered voters and a circulation period for an initiative to be 
placed on the ballot. However, those rules have wide cross state variations such as subject 
restrictions [legislative matters only, no restrictions and single subject, net signature 
requirements for a measure to be placed on the ballot such as the percentage from the previous 
 11 
 
number votes cast in gubernatorial or presidential elections and the geographical distribution of 
the number of signatures collected from registered voters]. The signature requirement for a 
measure to be placed on the ballot varies from a low of 3.5 % of registered voters in 
Massachusetts to a high of 15% of registered voters in Wyoming. 
The initiative measure has been used for a variety of issues, such as governance issues by 
establishing term limit for state governors; economic issues on tax and spending such as 
expenditure limitation; education issues, as this was the case in Florida in 2002 where the 
citizens approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution, limiting the number of students in 
core classes, to name a few examples. There have also been some high profile cases related to 
the initiative measure, such as Proposition  209  in California in 1996, the California Civil Rights 
Initiative, a ballot proposition which, upon being approved in the November 1996 
elections, amended the state constitution to prohibit state government institutions from 
considering race, sex, or ethnicity, specifically in the areas of public employment, public 
contracting or public education; Proposal 2  declared  English to be the official language for the 
conduct of government business in Utah in 2000. As Matsusaka (2005, p. 6) summarizes, “Over 
the last 15 years, voters have decided 12 initiatives on abortion-related topics, a flurry of 
propositions concerning job discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and numerous 
other issues related to social policy, such as capital punishment, medical marijuana, and 
physician-assisted suicide.” 
 At least two features of the initiative measure at the state level are noteworthy. First, no 
state with the initiative measure has done away with it. Second, another one i s the reason why 
they were adopted in the first place.  To my knowledge, the first question has not been addressed 
in the literature. The second issue however, although very recently, has been address somewhat, 
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though there still remains some mystery as to why some states adopted those measures in the 
first place. As an important step for moving forward toward advancing our understanding as to 
why some states adopted the initiative process is a relatively recent paper by Smith and Fridkin 
(2008) in the American Political Science Review, and it deserves to be quoted at length: Smith 
and Fridkin (2008, p.344) offer “considerable support for a political rather than a purely 
socioeconomic or regional, explanation for the genesis of direct democracy in the American 
states. In the midst of rapid national and subnational state building, we find that the size of the 
majority’s party surplus of seats and the relative youth of state political parties to be driving 
forces in the decision of state legislature to devolve institutional power.” 
 
III. Related Literature and Conceptual Framework   
For simplicity, I divide the direct democracy literature in two broad categories: outcome 
and mechanism. The former is mainly empirical in nature and deals with the impact of direct 
democracy on various policy outcomes while the latter is mostly theoretical and attempts to 
explain the underlying cause of different policy outcomes between initiative and non-initiative 
states. 
Outcome: The empirical literature on the impact of direct democracy on policy outcomes 
has been well documented. This literature has focused on the impact of direct democracy on 
government expenditures and revenues, mostly in the U.S. and in Switzerland. In the U.S., the 
seminal study on the impact of direct democracy on fiscal outcomes is Matsusaka (1995), who 
studies the fiscal impact of the initiative process on general government spending and revenues 
at the state level, finding that the presence of the initiative measure leads to a decrease in overall 
level of per capita state expenditures and revenues from 1960 to 1990. Pommerehne (1990) 
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provides similar evidence with respect to the impact of the presence of direct democracy on 
general level of government expenditures in Swiss cantons, while Funk and Gathmann (2011) 
find a modest effect of direct democracy on government spending at the cantonal level using 
historical data. Yet, at both the state level and the local level in the U.S., Zax (1989, p.267) finds 
that “Direct government expenditures per capita are significantly higher in both states and 
municipalities which permit initiatives” in 1980, while Camebreco (1998) finds no effect of 
direct democracy on state and local governments’ per capita expenditures from 1988 to 1990.  
Most empirical studies investigating the impact of the initiative measure on overall level 
of government expenditures do not explicitly model the choice of form of government. For 
example, with respect to states in the U.S., one wonders why the Progressive movement was 
successful in some states and not others?  Why do the states that have the initiative measure have 
not removed it?  These are open questions in the literature, and, therefore, the choice of form of 
government with respect to the initiative measure might be endogenous. One notable exception 
to the general trend in the empirical literature is Marshal and Ruhil (2005) who apply a 
maximum likely method to model the choice of government, finding that the initiative measure 
leads to an increase in general government expenditure and revenue per capita from 1960 to 
1990.1 Thus, empirically, the impact of direct democracy on government spending is ambiguous, 
with the weight of the evidence probably indicating that direct democracy lowers overall 
government spending.  
Mechanism: In light of the variety of studies empirically investigating the impact of 
direct democracy on policy outcomes, a natural question arises: why one would expect direct 
democracy to affect policy outcomes? A simple explanation would be that citizens in initiative 
                                                          
1 Sass (1991) also makes a somewhat similar argument, but in the case of local governments in the U.S. 
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states constantly propose new pieces of legislation that change the status quo. Therefore, the 
initiative measure would have a direct impact on policy outcomes.  However, the lack of 
observable campaign initiatives related to specific issues at the state level would suggest that the 
differences in fiscal outcomes between initiative and non-initiative states cannot be explained by 
ballot measures that are specifically related to state expenditure and revenue categories. 
Therefore, any policy effect attributed to the presence of direct democracy at the state level 
would have to do with its threat effect or indirect effect, not as a result of specific campaign 
initiatives.   
Several explanations have been advanced to explain why despite this lack of observable 
campaign initiatives directly related to expenditure and revenue categories, initiative and non-
initiative states have different fiscal outcomes. One of the very few studies that empirically 
attempt some explanation is Randolph (2010), estimating the impact of direct democracy on the 
number of bills enacted by the state legislature, finding that initiative states on average pass more 
legislations than non-initiative states. Randolph (2010) therefore concludes that the initiative 
measure affects policy outcomes trough legislative production. Cognizant of the fact that their 
constituents have the power to pass legislation, lawmakers in initiative states act preemptively by 
enacting more bills than lawmakers in non-initiative states. This line of argument provides 
empirical support to the notion of the threat effect of the initiative process. Similarly, Gerber 
(1996) proposes a game theoretical model with three players: an incumbent politician, a 
representative voter and an interest group to conclude that the strategic interactions of the three 
groups will align the politician’s choice closer to the voter’s preferred policy choice. That is, 
even if the initiative measure is not actually used, as is often the case at the state level in the 
U.S., its availability might still have an impact on policy choices through a threat effect. 
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Elsewhere, Besley and Coate (2000, 2008) hypothesize that the initiative process allows 
states to unbundle issues, as citizens in states with the initiative process can propose a piece of 
legislation and vote on specific issues, thus leading to congruence between policy outcomes and 
citizens’ preferences. In pure representative states, citizens impact policy outcomes mainly 
through their representatives. By voting for a candidate in pure representative states, citizens 
therefore vote for a menu of issues. In initiative states, however, citizens can vote on specific 
issues through the use of initiatives and referenda, leading to congruence between policy 
outcomes and citizens’ preferences. With respect to specific issues, Gerber (1999) argues that 
citizen initiatives increase congruence on issues such as the death penalty and abortion laws. 
Matsusaka (1992) and Matsusaka and McCarthy (2001) conclude that controversial issues are 
more likely to be decided by the initiative process, as lawmakers try to avoid some of the 
consequences of their controversial policy choices. 
In light of the theoretical literature, one wonders, then, about the causal mechanisms 
though which directs democracy might have an impact on expenditure redistribution and 
eventually income inequality. This issue has not been addressed theoretically in the literature. 
However, the one paper that this essay is closely related to relies on the median voter theorem 
(Feld, Fisher and Kirchgässner 2010). The empirical literature testing the prediction of the 
median voter theorem offers mixed evidence. One of the main explanations is that the stringent 
assumptions of the model are likely not to be held in empirical settings testing the prediction of 
the model. There are, however, other theoretical models of income redistribution that might offer 
some clues with respect to the impact of direct democracy on redistribution and eventually 
income inequality. Unfortunately, those models have not been specifically applied to the 
institution of direct democracy. 
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In any case, I conclude with Marshal and Ruhil (2005, p.322) that “the historical record 
and contemporary political theory both suggest that the relationships between adoption, use and 
consequences of the statewide initiative have yet to be explained,” and Matsusaka (2001), as 
cited in Marshal and Ruhil (2005, p.328), that “the effect of the initiative process has yet to be 
explained.”   
If the economics literature offers no clues as what one should expect regarding the 
eventual impact of direct democracy on redistribution and income inequality, recent political 
developments might offer some answers. For example, despite the fact that the adoption of the 
statewide initiative took place during the Progressive Era in the U.S., recent political 
developments related to this political institution on issues such as abortion and the death penalty 
would seem to suggest that the statewide initiative has yielded outcomes that are on the right of 
the political spectrum.  In addition, answers on recent surveys on the extent of inequality and 
redistribution on the U.S. are divided across partisan lines. 
In the end, although there is a lack of theoretical models that capture direct democracy at 
the state level in the U.S., in light of those recent political developments with respect to the 
statewide initiative and the evidence that direct democracy lowers per capita expenditures, a 
priori it would not be surprising to find a negative impact of direct democracy on redistribution 
and tax progressivity and increase in income inequality. I address this question in the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
 
IV. Empirical Specification  
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the extent to which the initiative measure in 
the American states affects budgetary choices related to expenditure redistribution, tax 
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progressivity and eventually income inequality. The initiative measure was adopted in most 
states at the turn of the 20th century, and it has not been removed. I cannot therefore exploit the 
panel nature of the data by using a fixed effects model since the within transformation would 
essentially wipe out the variable of interest, the initiative measure (excluding Mississippi, the 
only state that changed its status during the period under study: 1984-2005).   
I therefore follow previous literature by employing a pooled-OLS specification. To 
account for serial correlation, within-state spatial correlation and heteroskedasticity, all standard 
errors are clustered at the state level. I control for four census regions to account for regional 
time-invariant heterogeneity. In addition, I progressively control for other variables that are 
closely related to the initiative process that the literature has identified to be important, such as 
state government ideology, the signature requirement and the average number of voter initiatives 
placed on the ballot and their approval rate. 
To that end, I specify an equation of the following form:  
 
(1.1)                              𝑦𝑠𝑡       =       𝛼𝐷𝑠𝑡  +      𝛽xst   +      𝜐𝑡      +    𝜀𝑠𝑡, 
 
where   𝑦𝑠𝑡  is the outcomes of interest in state  s at time t,   xst  is a vector of control variables,   
 𝜐𝑡  and    𝜀𝑠𝑡  are year effects, and the usual error term, respectively. The variable of 
interest, 𝐷𝑠𝑡 , the initiative indicator, measuring the impact of direct democracy on policy 
outcomes.  
Following the political economy literature, I control for a rich set of variables where,  
 Xst ,  includes demographics characteristics [population, the fraction of the  population between 
the ages of 5 and 17, and the fraction of the population over the age of 65, percent of African 
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American and population density ; economic variables such as median income, per capita income 
and its square, unemployment rate, state minimum wage rate and  poverty rate; state political 
characteristics such as the share of democratic legislators  in the state senate and the state house 
of representatives, state government ideology, the share of the democratic votes received by the 
state governor in the last election, among other variables.    
In addition, there are other important features of the initiative measure that do not vary 
over time such as the signature requirement, the insulation index and the legislative index.  The 
signature requirement is the number of signatures from registered voters that need to be collected 
for a measure to be placed on the ballot. The qualification index measures the difficulty in 
qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot; the legislative insulation index measures the ability of 
the legislature to modify successful voter initiatives. Those features of the statewide initiative are 
taken into account in the empirical analysis in section VI. 
In general, one of the main advantages of using panel data is to mitigate heterogeneity 
bias. Here, heterogeneity is inherent in both the history and the evolution of the initiative process 
at the state level. First, the American progressive movement is largely credited to have led to the 
successful campaigns that allowed most states to adopt the initiative measure and why the 
movement was successful in some states and no others is left for debate. Second, there is 
heterogeneity with respect to the institution itself such as the geographic distribution for the 
signature requirement for a piece of legislation to be placed on the ballot. Third, the America 
progressive movement was a leftist movement, but differences in policy outcomes between 
initiative and non-initiative states over the years would suggest that the initiative measure or its 
impact might be much complex, as initiative states pass on average more conservative policies 
with respect to death penalty and abortion, to name a few examples. Fourth, different years of 
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cross-sectional data lead to different conclusions with respect to the impact of direct democracy 
on government spending. Hence, given these issues and the lack of a theoretical prediction, to 
exploit the panel nature of the data and complement the findings of the pooled OLS 
specification, I employ an unobserved effects model: Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model 
(Wooldridge 2010).  
Following Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), I therefore model the relationship between 
unobserved heterogeneity and the time-varying variables, specifying the following model: 
 
 (1.2)                             𝑦𝑠𝑡       =      𝛼Dst   +     𝛽xst    +       𝛾𝜔𝑠     +       𝜀𝑠𝑡,  
 
where  𝑦𝑠𝑡  the outcome of interest,  xst  is vector of state time-varying covariates, 𝜔𝑠  is a vector 
of regional indicators and  𝜀𝑠𝑡  is the error term. I am interested in 𝛼, the coefficient of direct 
democracy.   I then rewrite the error component as  𝜀𝑠𝑡 =  𝜃𝑠 +  𝜂𝑠𝑡, where  𝜃𝑠  is a state random 
effect and   𝜂𝑠𝑡  is the usual error term.  
Following Mundlak (1978), relaxed by Chamberlain (1982), I allow for correlation 
between the state random effect  𝜃𝑠  and the time-varying variables   xst  by assuming the 
following structure of the state random effect: 
 
(1.3)                                               𝜃𝑠   =   ∑ 𝜌𝑠?̅?𝑠𝑡
𝑇
𝑡−1   +   𝜎𝑠, 
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where  𝜎𝑠  is a pure error term not correlated with the random effect, while the correlation 
between the state random effect and the time-varying variables takes the form  𝜌𝑠?̅?𝑠𝑡, with ?̅?𝑠 
being the average of the   xs over time. 
Finally, adding both the state random effects and the time effects T to specification (1.2), 
I use the following device to estimate the correlated random effects model:   
 
(1.4)             𝑦𝑠𝑡      =      𝛼𝐷𝑠𝑡   +    𝛽xst  +   υ𝑇  +    𝛾𝜔𝑠  +  ∑ 𝜌𝑠?̅?𝑠𝑡
𝑇
𝑡−1   +   𝜎𝑠   +   𝜂𝑠𝑡, 
 
 where all the variables are defined as before. One advantage of this procedure is that it allows 
for a modest way to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity while also controlling 
for several arguably endogenous time-invariant variables such as the signature requirement, the 
legislative insulation index and the initiative indicator. With the inclusion of the regional 
indicators, this approach is close to a fixed effects model. One drawback of this approach is that 
the time-invariant variables are not allowed to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity. I 
partially mitigate this drawback by letting an indicator dummy for tax measures placed on the 
ballot be correlated with the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The ultimate drawback of 
this approach is that a functional form must be specified for the correlation between the time-
varying variables and unobserved heterogeneity. In short, the CRE approach provides a modest 
way to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
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V. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The data for this study were drawn from several sources. For the first outcome of interest, 
expenditure redistribution, I use data from the Survey of Government Finances of the Census. 
The census has detailed state level data on different categories of government expenditures that I 
used to create the share of expenditures on education, health, hospital and public welfare. The 
Survey of Government Finances of the Census also contains several categories of state tax 
revenues that I intend to include in the final draft of this essay.  
For the second outcome of interest, I use the state income inequality data from Frank 
(2009) (available at http://www.shsu.edu/~eco_mwf/). The measures of income inequality used 
in this dissertation essay are the Atkinson index, Theil index, Gini index, and the percentage 
income share of the top 10% and top 1% of income earners. The income inequality measures 
have been previously used by Frank (2009) and Chintrakarn, Herzer, and Nunnenkamp (2011), 
both published in the Economic Inquiry.  
I use population data from the intercensal estimates of the Census Bureau to control for 
the median age of the population and to create the fraction of the state population between the 
ages 5 and 17, and the fraction of the population over the age of 65. I also use data from the 
statistical abstract of the census (selected years) to control for state population density. State 
economic characteristics such as income per capita and median income are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. I also control for the average number of voter initiatives appearing on the ballot 
over each two year-election cycles from 1984-2005, and I also control for their approval rate. 
I use several political variables from the public use data collected by Carl Klarner of 
Indiana State University: state partisan balance such as the share of democratic senators and 
house representatives in the state legislature, an indicator variable measuring whether the state 
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governor in office and the party in control of the state senate are of the same party. The state 
government ideology index comes from the updated version of Berry et al. 1998 (available at   
http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/). 
Following Bowler and Donovan (2004), I control for the qualification difficulty index 
which ranges from 1 to 6. The qualification index measures the difficulty in qualifying a voter 
initiative for the ballot, and it decreases as the values increase.  I also control for the legislative 
insulation index which ranges from 1 to 9 with the insulation to the legislature decreasing as the 
values increase.  As is the case in the literature, non-initiative states receive a value of 0.  
Data with respect to the initiative measure such as the signature requirement for a 
measure to be placed on the ballot are from the Initiative and Referendum Institute.2 I use 
intergovernmental revenues from the Survey of Government Finances of the Census. I use the 
share of African American at the state for the Abstract from the Census, as African Americans 
tend to be more supportive of redistribution, state population growth and the share of the 
population living in Metro areas.  I use marginal and average state tax data from the TAXISM 
program of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Table 1.1 presents means and standard deviations for key variables used in this study. 
Column (1) presents summary statistics for all the sample as a whole; in general, across most of 
the outcome variables such as tax progressivity, income inequality, expenditure and revenue 
distribution, there do not seem to be systematic differences between initiative and non-initiative 
states.    
    
                                                          
2 Initiative and Referendum Institute: http://www.iandrinstitute.org/. Accessed in 2013, 2014 
(various months). 
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VI. Results   
A. Expenditure Redistribution  
             In this section, I present the findings on the impact of direct democracy on expenditure 
redistribution. Using a baseline specification from Eq. 1.1, as we can see from columns (1) 
though (4) of Table 1.2, on the whole, it would seem that the adoption of the state wide initiative 
does not have a significant impact on several categories of expenditure redistribution.  The 
estimated coefficient for health expenditures is positive and significant, yet small; the point 
estimate for hospital expenditures is negative and significant, while the estimated coefficients for 
education and public welfare are statistically insignificant and negative.  
              To further probe these findings and given the mystery surrounding the adoption of the 
statewide initiative and the cross state variation in the signature requirements for a measure to be 
placed on the state ballot, a dummy variable for the statewide initiative may not capture 
heterogeneity inherent to the institution. I therefore explore this issue, taking into account the 
signature requirement. In Table 1.3, adding both the difficulty index and the insulation index, 
both the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients from columns (1) through (4) remain 
unchanged.  Including only year fixed effects and no control variables in Table 1.4, from the 
point estimates from columns (1) through (5), only the coefficients for hospital expenditures 
become significant at the 5% level. Adding a dummy variable for southern states, in Table 1.5, 
the point estimate for expenditures on hospital remains negative and significant, albeit weakly 
significant. 
             To summarize the findings of this section, overall, direct democracy seems to have a 
modest impact on expenditure redistribution. The findings are never statistically significance for 
education spending (in contrast to Berry 2009), while they are sometimes significant for both 
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public welfare and hospital expenditures (always with a negative sign), depending on the 
econometric specifications.  The coefficient for health expenditures, however, is statically 
significant and positive in the baseline model, probably due the heavy involvement of the federal 
government in the health system through Medicare and Medicaid.  On balance, these findings are 
in line with Felds et al. (2010) and Hinnerich and Pettersson‐Lidbom (2014), and opposite to 
Berry (2009). 
Turning to the findings of the CRE model, Tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 present the findings, 
progressively taking into account the insulation index and the difficulty index. In contrast to the 
pooled OLS results, these later results show that direct democracy significantly lowers education 
expenditures. The point estimates across all three specifications are highly significant. This latest 
finding is in line with Berry (2009). 
 
B. Tax Progressivity 
             In table 1.9, I turn to the effect of direct democracy on tax progressivity using measures 
of state tax progressivity from the TAXISM program from the NBER.3 In general, average tax 
rate is the share of income one pays in taxes, while marginal tax rate is the tax rate imposed on 
the last dollar of income. Both tax measures are often used in the tax incidence literature to 
gauge the degree of progressivity of tax systems.  
              Columns (1) through (6) from Table 1.9 present the results for the impact of direct 
democracy on tax progressivity. All the coefficients are negative and statistically insignificant, 
implying no effect of the statewide initiative on the progressivity of state tax systems. The results 
                                                          
3 For a general reference of this program, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993)   “An Introduction to the TAXSIM 
Model", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 12 no. 1. 
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remain more or less the same in both sign and magnitude by removing all the control variables 
one at a time.  From columns (1) through (6) of Table 1.9, I show a progression of the point 
estimates, starting with the baseline model in column (1) and leading to my most-flexible 
specification in column (5). Adding the signature requirement to the baseline specification does 
not change the estimated coefficients in columns (2) and (5).   Next, the results still hold to the 
addition of the difficulty index and the insulation index in columns (3) and (6) of the same table. 
Regardless of the econometric specifications, the point estimates remain negative. That the point 
estimates do not seem to be particularly sensitive to controlling for these features of the  
statewide initiative lends support to the notion that direct democracy does not have an impact on 
the state tax systems. In columns (1) though (4) of Table 1.11, excluding all the control variables 
and including either year fixed-effects or a dummy for southern states do not change the sign nor 
the magnitude of the point estimates.  
 
C. Robustness checks   
In this section, an attempt is made to further assess the effect of direct democracy on state 
tax systems, taking into consideration some additional robustness checks. 
Indeed, one ongoing debate in the direct democracy literature is the mechanisms through 
which the statewide initiative impacts policy outcomes. The debate centers on the direct vs 
indirect impact role of the initiative measure. For example, some studies have hypothesized that 
direct democracy affects policy outcomes through an indirect effect in the sense that, regardless 
of the number measures placed on the state ballot, the presence of the statewide initiative 
measure itself is sufficient to impact fiscal outcomes, by altering the behavior of the state 
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legislature.  I account for the direct impact of the statewide initiative, linking specific tax 
referenda to fiscal outcomes. 
To that end, I undertake a simple exercise, compiling all tax measures that were placed 
on the state ballot from 1984 to 2005. In Table 1.10, even when controlling for whether in a 
given year a tax measure was placed on the state ballot (Tax measure), the coefficients of the 
dummy indicator for direct democracy  in columns (1) and (2) remain insignificant. In addition, 
using a dummy indicator (Tax measure+) for whether in a given year a tax measure placed on the 
state ballot was approved does not change the point estimates of marginal and average tax in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.8.In brief, this exercise provides support to the findings in the 
previous section; direct democracy does not have a significant impact on state tax progressivity. 
As done previously, I further probe the robustness of these findings using a CRE model. 
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 present the results for both marginal and average tax rates. To facilitate 
comparison between the two models, columns (1) through (3)  from Table 1.12 replicate the OLS 
findings while the last three columns present the results for marginal tax rates using the CRE 
model, which shows that the point estimates are positive and significant, implying that direct 
democracy leads to an increase in marginal tax rate. Turning to Table 1.13, the findings with 
respect to average tax rate are similar.    
 
D.  State Tax Burden 
So far, the empirical evidence suggests that direct democracy has no significant impact 
on average and marginal state tax progressivity, although the signs of the coefficients remain 
negative across the different econometric specifications. It might be useful to recall that in a 
federal system with a high degree of mobility, as is the case in the U.S., subnational governments 
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such as states might be limited on how much they can use the tax systems for redistributive 
purposes (Chamberlain and Prante 2007; Davis et al. 2009). Given that limitation, I now turn to 
other proxies of tax progressivity by investigating how direct democracy impacts state tax 
burden, which is a broad measure of how much state residents pay in tax to their own states. 
Table 1.14 presents the results, starting from the baseline specification in column (1) to a more 
flexible specification in column (5), by progressively adding the signature requirement, dummy 
indicators for tax ballot measures, the difficulty index, the insulation index; there seems to be 
strong evidence showing that direct democracy lowers overall state tax burden, as all the point 
estimates are negative and highly significant. 
 Here, I repeat the same exercise as in the preceding paragraph, but excluding all the 
control variable. In columns (1) through (4) of Table 1.15,   I show a progression of the point 
estimates, starting with the baseline model in column (1) and leading to a flexible specification in 
column (4).  Controlling only for year fixed effects, the point estimate in column (1) is still 
negative but statistically insignificant. Adding a dummy indicator for southern states, the point 
estimate in column (2) becomes significant.  Repeating the same exercise as in the preceding 
sections, linking policy outcomes to specific tax measures placed on the state ballot, the 
coefficients of the dummy indicator for direct democracy in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.15 
are negative and statistically significant.  The findings are robust to the use of different 
econometric specifications; in short, there is strong indication that direct democracy significantly 
lowers overall state tax burden.  However, the statistical significance disappears when 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as can be observed in Table 1.16. 
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E.  Income Inequality  
In Table 1.17, I turn to the impact of direct democracy on income inequality.  From the 
benchmark specification, all the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, implying 
that direct democracy worsens income inequality at the state level in the U.S. This finding is in 
line with Felds et al. (2010) who find that direct democracy has also led to an increase in income 
inequality in Swiss cantons. 
From Table 1.18 to Table 1.21, I show a progression of the point estimates using flexible 
specifications. Including the signature requirement in Table 1.18, the effects become smaller, as 
the point estimates are significant only for the Atkinson index and the Gini index (10% level). In 
Table 1.19, controlling for a dummy indicator for whether a tax measure was placed on the state 
ballot, all point estimates are positive and statistically significant. Adding a control variable for 
at least one successful tax measure, from columns (1) through (5) of Table 1.16, the coefficients 
remain the same, both in significance and magnitude. In Table 1.20, with no control variables 
and only year fixed effects, the Gini index remains positive and significant. Adding a dummy 
variable for southern states, as we can see from Table 1.21, there is overwhelming evidence on 
the impact of direct democracy on income inequality. That the estimated coefficients are robust 
to additional controls such as the signature requirement and whether a successful tax measure 
was placed on the ballot lends support to the notion that variation in state-level income inequality 
is not systematically related to unobservable variables that might impact both direct democracy 
and income inequality.   
Taking into account state-level heterogeneity, Tables 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24 present the 
results for the CRE specification, progressively controlling for the insulation index and the 
difficulty index. Here, in contrast to the findings for state tax burden and marginal and average 
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tax rates, the findings for income inequality show that all the point estimates are positive, 
although the significant disappear in some of the specifications.   
 
VII. Conclusion  
 The focus of this first dissertation chapter was on the impact of direct democracy on 
redistribution and income inequality in the American states from 1984 to 2005. The 
consequences of rising income inequality are well-known. For example, a rise in income 
inequality is correlated with an increase criminal activities and a decrease in intergenerational 
mobility. Policymakers and the public at large are concerned with the increase in income 
inequality. As recently as June 3, 2015, the New York Times reported on a Times/CBS poll that 
finds that Americans are concerned with the increase in income inequality.  
Contributing to the current policy debate, however modestly, in this dissertation chapter, 
I explore an alternative explanation to the rising income inequality issue, investigating the role 
played by a specific political institution. As mentioned earlier, there is no unique way to measure 
redistribution and inequality. With this caveat in mind, the picture painted in this essay shows  
that the presence of the statewide initiative to lead to an increase in income inequality and a 
decrease on overall state tax burden with no effect on state tax progressivity and a small effect on 
expenditure redistribution. Future research might to further investigate the impact of direct 
democracy along different segments of the income distribution. Using the traditional methodoly 
employed in the literature, overall, the findings provide support to empirical studies that have 
argued that the adoption of the statewide initiative impacts policy outcomes. However, if 
Hinnerich and Pettersson‐Lidbom (2014) attribute similar findings with respect to direct 
democracy in Swiss cantons to the appropriation of elites, whether such an explanation can be 
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applied to states in the U.S. is left for debate. However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
using a CRE model, I find strong evidence that direct democracy leads to an increase in both 
marginal and average tax rates, a decrease in education expenditures and no effect on state tax 
burden and income inequality. These findings have implications for the literature which mostly 
employs the pooled OLS specification, thus falling to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Several remaining issues should be emphasized. First, the overwhelming evidence on the 
impact of direct democracy on income inequality and overall state tax burden implies that further 
research is needed to disentangle the mechanisms of direct democracy on income inequality and 
redistribution.  Although there is a sizable literature on the impact of direct democracy, much 
research is needed to sort out the mechanisms through which this institution impacts policy 
outcomes.  
Second, one should probably be cautious in making policy recommendations with respect 
to the findings of this essay due to the limited capacity of states in the U.S. to redistribute income 
and eventually impact inequality. In a federal system with a high degree of mobility as is the case 
of the U.S., not all taxes are at the disposal of sub-national governments for redistributive 
purposes.  Indeed, the findings of the existing literature on the capacity of state affect 
redistribution through the tax system are mixed (Chamberlain and Prante 2007; Davis et al. 
2009). 
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Chapter II Direct Democracy, Local Governments and Fiscal Spillovers: Evidence from 
California Counties 
 
I. Introduction   
Much has been written on the extent of strategic interactions among governments in the 
public finance literature. However, with very few exceptions, strategic interactions are mostly 
analyzed in the context of a purely representative form of government whereby citizens impact 
policy outcomes mostly indirectly, through elections by voting for their representatives, 
petitioning the government or lobbying elected officials. In systems that allow the use of direct 
democracy, such as the system in place in local governments in the state of California, citizens 
can directly express their policy preferences through the use of initiatives and referenda. Are 
strategic interactions more likely to occur in direct democracy? 
In this paper, in a direct democracy context due to the relatively large number of tax and 
expenditure referenda at the county level in California, I add to the literature by investigating the 
extent of strategic interactions using a novel dataset of revenue and expenditure categories for all 
the 58 counties in California from 2003 to 2013.  Specifically, I address the question of whether 
or not county governments influence one another in choosing their fiscal choices (spending and 
revenues). Though most of the empirical literature on the strategic interaction between 
neighboring jurisdictions use tax rates, a sizable part of the literature has argued that tax 
decisions are likely to be reflected in the budget constraints of local governments.  
There are several reasons why counties might be influenced by the fiscal choices of their 
neighbors.  First, strategic interactions might take place due to expenditure and revenue 
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mimicking, whereby counties imitate the expenditure and revenue patterns of their neighbors. 
Second, strategic interactions might be due to Yardstick competition, as citizens or voters take 
into account fiscal choices in neighboring jurisdiction in judging their elected officials. Third, 
due to spillover benefits or externalities, government spending and tax receipts in a jurisdiction 
might spread across multiple jurisdictions. In this paper, I do not make a distinction with respect 
to which mechanisms are more likely to be the case for county governments in California.  
This paper contributes to at least two strands of the political economy and public finance 
literatures. From a political economy perspective, local referenda play an important role in fiscal 
decisions in California counties. Hence, given the direct democracy context in which this 
analysis is carried out, this paper is perhaps closely related to Isen (2014) who finds no revenue 
spillover effects analyzing local tax referenda for counties, municipalities and school districts in 
the US state of Ohio.  From a public finance perspective, I add to a rather large literature testing 
for the effects of fiscal interactions across various levels of governments both within and outside 
of the U.S.  
Overall, I have found strong evidence of fiscal spillovers at the county level in California. 
Specifically, with respect to revenue categories, I have found strategic interactions in revenues 
from sales, general and transient taxes.  On the expenditure side, fiscal spillovers exist with 
respect to general, public protection, public facilities expenditures. However, reassuringly, there 
are no spillover effects with respect to health and public assistance expenditures; this latter 
finding can be attributed to the fact that those two expenditure categories are largely determined 
at the state level.  In sum, the findings of this study are in line with an extensive empirical 
literature, finding that fiscal spillovers do exists.  
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This study has several policy implications related to the relationship between state 
governments and local governments in the U.S. In general, state governments are heavily 
involved in local education spending. There are likely to be benefit spillovers related to 
education expenditures, and, therefore, local governments might compete with one another along 
other expenditure dimensions.  Also, specific to California, the state has heavy influence on local 
revenues through the property tax, state policymakers should be mindful that local governments 
interact with one another along other revenue dimensions. 
The paper proceeds, in Section II, by describing the institution of direct democracy and 
public finance at the local level. The next section reviews the empirical literature. Section IV 
presents the conceptual framework. Section V describes the data. Section VI presents the 
empirical specification. Section VII presents the results. The last section concludes and discusses 
the results. 
 
II. County Referenda and Local Public Finance 
In this section, I provide a brief description of direct democracy at the local level. I also 
briefly describe county tax and expenditure referenda. 
Most discussions regarding the institution of direct democracy take place at the state level 
in the U.S., most probably due to an increase in the number of controversial issues placed on the 
ballot over the last two decades.  However, direct democracy is much more used at the local 
level than at the state level in the U.S. (Gordon 2004). In local governments throughout the U.S., 
the use of the initiative process is much more common than at the state level. Seventy (70) 
percent of Americans live in cities where the initiative process is available (Gordon 2004). 
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More generally, California has a long history with the institution of direct democracy, 
starting in 1911, right after Hiram Johnson had been elected governor. He had run on under the 
banner of the Progressive Party, attempting to limit the influence of special interests (Gordon 
2004). California is at the forefront when it comes to the frequent use of direct democracy at the 
state level, as it is second behind Oregon in the number of initiatives placed on the ballot from 
when the first initiative appeared on the ballot in Oregon in 1904 to 2012.4  
At the local level in California, all three levels of government (counties, school districts, 
cities) have put this institutional feature to frequent use. Citizens have made use of direct 
democracy, as the majority of the counties, cities and school districts at least several times a year 
between 2003 and 2013, the period under study. At the county level, the subject of this study, 
ballot measures are used to address issues of local concern such as urban growth boundaries, 
limiting the terms of their elected officials, establishing rent control, permitting gambling, 
imposing taxes for transportation or public safety, and reducing or repealing utility user taxes 
(Gordon 2004). 
Furthermore, local governments such as counties, municipalities and school districts in 
California pass various types of tax referenda. To be approved, tax referenda require two-thirds 
of the vote at the county level, while there is variation in the requirements for the other two local 
governments (municipalities and school districts). I present below two examples of approved tax 
referenda as they appeared on the ballot in Amador County in 2008 and Marin County in 2006 in 
the hope of establishing the link between fiscal choices and local referenda.   
 
                                                          
4 Initiative and Referendum Institute: http://www.iandrinstitute.org/. Accessed, January 2014.  
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AMADOR 11/4/2008 Measure M Pass (2/3 required) 
Shall Amador County enact a one-half cent sales tax for fire 
protection and emergency response services, with the proceeds 
allocated to local fire districts as described in Ordinance No. 1676 
(including reallocation to reflect any changes in the number of 
districts), to be used for paid fire fighter-emergency medical 
response personnel to staff existing fire stations, administrative 
support, and volunteer insurance, training and incentive 
programs?  
 
MARIN 11/7/2006 Measure H Pass (2/3 required) 
To continue emergency paramedic care, shall Ordinance No. 3458 
be approved effective July 1, 2007, increasing the maximum 
special tax for paramedic services from a maximum of $61.00 to a 
maximum of $85.00 per year for each living unit, and from eight 
cents ($0.08) to eleven cents ($0.11) per square foot of structure of 
each non-residential structure? 
 
As one can see from those two examples above, the wording from the wording of the 
language is unambiguous with respect to the purpose of the measure. This is important because 
there is a branch in the direct democracy literature that argues that voters are not competent to 
directly make fiscal decisions and are probably misled by the shrewdness of interest groups 
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through political campaigns. It would seem to me that the voters are well aware of the tax 
increase contained in the language of the two examples above. However, whether voters are 
myopic when it comes to the consequences of their fiscal decisions is up for debate. 
 From 2003 to 20013, the period under study, a fair number of tax measures were placed 
on the ballot. For example, in 2013, 39 revenue measures were placed on the county ballot. In 
2012, an election year, 99 revenue measures were placed on the ballot. The numbers are 
somewhat similar for other years in period under study. Given the extensive use of county tax 
referenda, I deem it unnecessary to argue on a possible link between direct democracy and fiscal 
choices. 
Similarly, with respect to expenditures, from 2003 to 2013, for example, on average, at 
least one expenditure measure was placed on the ballot. In 2012, 12 expenditure measures dealt 
with transportation, 23 with public facilities, 7 with housing and 11 with general government 
services. Given that the citizens themselves can make tax and spending decisions, is direct 
democracy more likely to lead to fiscal interactions? In other words, in addition to elected 
officials responding to the fiscal choices of neighboring jurisdictions, do the citizens do so as 
well?   
 
III.  Related Literature  
The economics literature on the extent of fiscal spillovers is well-developed. Both within 
and outside of the U.S, most of the findings in the empirical literature favor the presence of 
strategic interaction across jurisdictions.  However, there are a few dissenters, and this literature 
review is not meant to be exhaustive.5 
                                                          
5 For a review of the literature, see, e.g., Bruckner (2003) and Delgado et al. (2015).  
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At the outset, I shall briefly mention that there are several ways in which to examine the 
extent of strategic interaction in county governments. One way of doing so is by examining the 
expenditure side of the budget. Naturally, one can also look at the revenue side of the pubic 
budget by examining revenue categories. Finally, some studies have done so using at tax rates. In 
this study, I consider the first two policy outcomes.  
One of the first studies to test for the presence of fiscal interactions is Case, Hines and 
Rosen (1993), who find significant spillover effects with respect to expenditure levels at the state 
level in the U.S. Using U.S. state-level data from 1960 to 1988, Besley and Case (1995) find that 
states do engage in Yardstick completion, whereby voters pay attention to what is happening in 
neighboring states and hold their elected officials accountable. Figlio et al. (1999) find sizable 
welfare competition at the state level in the U.S. using panel data from 1983 to 1994.  Brueckner 
and Saavedra (2001) find the presence of strategic interaction in property tax using data for cities 
in the Metropolitan Boston area.  Other studies in the literature are Baicker (2005), Millimet and 
Rangaprasad (2006), to name a few. 
Elsewhere, outside of the U.S., a number of studies have examined the extent of strategic 
interactions.  Gerard et al. (2010) find the presence of tax interactions among Belgian 
municipalities. Dubois and Paty (2008) find that French cities engage in Yardstick competition. 
Buettner (2003) finds a modest impact of fiscal externalities using data for German 
municipalities.  Using data for local governments in Spain, Sole-Olle (2006) finds the presence 
of strategic interactions at both expenditure levels and neighbors’ populations and expenditures.  
Delgado et al. (2015) show support to the hypothesis of tax mimicking in local governments in 
Spain. Liu and Martinez-Vazquez (2014) find evidence of tax interactions across provincial 
governments in China.  
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Despite the somewhat extensive empirical literature testing for the presence of strategic 
interactions, given the role played by direct democracy at the county level in California, this 
dissertation chapter is perhaps closely related to  at least two recent  studies  that have examined 
the extent of strategic interactions  in a direct democracy context. First,  Reback (2011) 
investigates the issues of strategic interactions with respect to direct democracy by comparing 
U.S. school districts with and without direct democracy, finding that strategic interactions is at 
least as large in representative democracy as in direct democracy. Yet, Isen (2014) who does so 
entirely in a direct democracy context examining school district, municipality county tax 
referenda, finding no presence of fiscal spillovers across all three levels of government.  
 In the end, whether one investigates the extent of fiscal spillovers between neighboring 
jurisdictions by looking at tax rates, expenditures or revenues, there is no clear prediction as to 
what one should expect when examining at the extent of strategic interactions exists in county 
and expenditures and revenues at the local level. In brief, it would seem that the contexts in 
which these studies are carried out seem to matter as much. 
By and large, three different types of methodological approaches seem to have been used 
in the literature. One strand of the literature has used the GMM approach (Dubois and Paty 2008; 
Liu and Martinez-Vazquez 2014, among others). Another popular approach is to use as 
instruments the weighted average of the neighbors’ control variables. This is the approach taken 
by, for instance, Case (1993), Besley and Case (1995). Third, the maximum likelihood approach 
has also been used (Bordignon et al. 2003, Besley and Case 1995, Allers and Elhorst 2005). A 
notable and intersting departure from the methodological approaches in the literature is Isen 
(2014), who use a regression discontinuity design, analyzing tax referenda that were passed and 
failed to be approved at around 50 % of the votes. Unfortunately, here, this is not feasible, as 
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county tax referenda in California require two-thirds of the vote to be successful.6   In this 
chapter, I use the first approach. In the near future, I plan to explore those alternative 
methodological approaches. 
 
IV. Conceptual Framework   
Very briefly, as with the empirical literature, the theoretical literature on the extent of 
fiscal interactions is well-developed. There are several hypothesis regarding fiscal interactions 
among neighboring jurisdictions. Fiscal interdependence or strategic interaction might take place 
due to benefit spillovers, externalities, tax mimicking and Yardstick competition.  The presence 
of all these factors might be in place at the same time, and it is often quite difficult to distinguish 
among them. I therefore make no a priori judgment with respect to which mechanism (s) is likely 
to be relevant at the county level in California.   
 First, the theory of Yardstick completion, based on the work of Besley and Case (1995) 
and subsequently Shleifer (1995), conjecture that fiscal spillovers taka place because voters or 
citizens in one jurisdiction are likely to be cognizant of what is happening in neighboring 
jurisdictions and therefore use that information in their decision-making process, say, by holding 
elected officials in their own jurisdictions accountable.  Due to the threat of re-election, 
incumbent office-holders might then try to find a way to avoid the unfavorable prospects in 
upcoming elections. Interestingly, given that direct democracy is allowed at the county level, 
citizens might be cognizant of the outcomes of tax and expenditure referenda that take place in 
neighboring jurisdictions and act accordingly in their own jurisdictions or use that information in 
                                                          
6 Reback (2011) is also a departure from the usual instrumental variable approach employed in the literature. 
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the next election. Does this additional power in the hand of the electorate make strategic 
interactions more likely? 
Second, fiscal interactions across jurisdictions might be a story of externalities or benefit 
spillovers, whereby spending and revenue decisions in one jurisdiction spread to other 
jurisdictions.  This is often the case because governments are often not able to confine their fiscal 
decisions to their own border. As with Yardstick competition, externalities or benefit spillovers 
might come from the electorate directly, as citizens are able to make spending and revenue 
decisions through referenda.  
Further, fiscal interactions at the local level might arise from jurisdictions competing with 
one another in a Tiebout- type environment. In such an environment whereby people are free to 
move or vote with their feet in search of  their most preferred location, jurisdictions often 
compete with one another through the bundles of public goods that they offer to their residents.  
Besides Yardstick competition, externalities and benefit spillovers, mimicking behavior 
either through taxes, expenditures or revenues might be the driving factor behind fiscal 
spillovers. One can easily imagine a scenario whereby a jurisdiction follows the successful 
spending and revenue patterns of its neighbor(s). At the other extreme, county governments 
might just do the opposite of what their neighbors do, in which case one would expect a robust 
negative correlation in fiscal choices of neighboring counties.  
In the end, though quite a few empirical studies have sought to disentangle the 
mechanism through which fiscal interactions occur, I find it appropriate to reiterate here that I 
make no a priori judgment with respect to which mechanism (s) might be likely to be relevant in 
the context of this study. That is, strategic interactions among local governments might be due all 
of the above mentioned reasons.  Moreover, disentangling the appropriate mechanism is often 
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empirically challenging. This is even more so in the context of this study, as citizens themselves 
can directly impact fiscal decisions through local referenda. 
V. Empirical Framework   
My primary objective in this dissertation chapter is to gauge the extent to which fiscal 
spillovers exist at the county level in California with respect to revenue and expenditure 
categories.  For simplicity, the notation for the empirical specification presented below is for 
revenues. Mutatis mutandis, the specification for expenditure categories is similar. Although 
there are some slight variations, the empirical methodology testing for the presence of strategic 
interactions is more or less straightforward.7  I therefore follow Deveraux et al. (2004), Sole Ollé 
(2006), Dreher (2006) and Foucault et al. (2009), assuming that a county’s reaction function can 
be written down as follows: 
2.1                                                    𝑅𝑐,𝑡   =    𝑅𝑐 (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡, 𝑋𝑐,𝑡), 
where  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 as is a vector of revenue categories in  county c at time t. 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 is the vector of 
revenues in the set of the other counties j ( j ≠ c) at time t, and 𝑋𝑐,𝑡 is a vector of demographic 
and economic variables of county c at time t. Using  the vector  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 in an econometric 
specification, I  have the following: 
2.2                   𝑅𝑐,𝑡   =      𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1    +      𝛽2𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡  +   𝛽2Xct   +    Ф𝑐   +    𝜂𝑡𝑡   +     𝜀𝑐𝑡,     
 
                                                          
7 For a review of the most common methodologies used in the empirical literature, see, e.g., Brueckner 
(2003). 
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where  𝑅𝑐,𝑡   is the dependent variable for revenue categories,    𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1    is a one-year 
lag of the dependent variable because of hysteresis in government fiscal choices, the variable of 
interest,    𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡   is the weighted average of revenue categories of the neighbors of county  c,    
Xct    is a vector of control variables such as median income, income per capita, unemployment 
rate and demographic variables,   Ф𝑐  is county-fixed effect. Ideally, I would want to include year 
effects, but due to the large number of instruments being created and issues of multicolinearity, 
following Devereux et al. 2004; Liu and Martinez-Vazquez 2014, I include a common time trend 
for all counties,  𝜂𝑡𝑡. 
Quite often, an important issue in spatial econometric analysis is the choice of a 
weighting matrix. There are several ways to specify the weighting matrix. One way might be 
through a contiguity matrix whereby a value of 1 is used if two counties share the same border 
and   zero otherwise. Another way might be through the use of the Euclidian distance between 
two counties.  Some studies have constructed the weighting matrix based the economic and 
demographic of the geographical units. 
A priori it is nearly impossible to know the correct measure of neighborhoodness; 
therefore, in this paper, I assume that neighbors are counties that share the same border. 
However, given that specifying the degree of neighborhoodness is often arbitrary, ideally, one 
would like to use several approaches and investigate the sensitivity of the findings to choice of 
weighting schemes.   
Following previous literature that attempts to determine the extent of fiscal interactions, 
to account for hysteresis in the composition of government own-source revenues and/or reverse 
causation, I include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. At least two issues bear 
mention:  the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and the potential endogeneity of 
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approved tax referenda. To address those issues, I use dynamic panel techniques (Blundel and 
Bond 1988). Notwithstanding some caveat, this technique is extensively used in the literature 
and is well suited to the nature of the data in this third essay, given the relative short time 
dimension (T=11) and the relative large county dimension (N=58). 
System GMM allows me to address the issue of endogeneity by specifying two (2) 
equations: one in difference and the other in levels. The set of equations in levels uses lagged 
first-differences as instruments, while the set of equations in first-differences uses lagged levels 
as instruments. Therefore, the first-difference of equation (2.2) is not correlated with the errors 
from that equation, thus making the endogenous variables pre-determined and uncorrelated with 
the ‘new’ error term in equation (2.2).  
 
VI. Data  
The data for this study were drawn from several sources. First, I hand-compiled a dataset 
of revenue and expenditure categories from the Counties Annual Report of the California State 
Controller’s Office from 2003 to 2013.8 Those annual reports contain detailed information on 
several government revenue and expenditure categories.  For expenditures categories, I use 
general, health, public assistance, police protection and public facilities. For revenue categories,   
I use revenues from sales, transient and other taxes (minus revenues from intergovernmental 
transfer).   However, revenues from the property tax, although in general terms a significant part 
of local governments’ budgets in most states in the U.S., are rightly excluded from the empirical 
analysis due to the fact that Proposition 13, passed in 1973, limits the amount of revenues that 
local governments can raise through the property tax.  Data on tax and expenditure referenda 
                                                          
8 http://www.sco.ca.gov/ard_locrep_counties.html. 
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were obtained from the California Elections Data Archive (CEDA) at the Sacramento State 
Institute for Social Research. 
Demographic variables such as the share of the county population that is white, Hispanic, 
Asian and African-American come from the California Department of Finance, which has 
detailed data on county population estimate by race and age in all the 58 counties. Following 
previous literature investigating the extent of strategic interactions, I include a control variable 
for poverty from the Census such as the percentage of the county population under the poverty 
level. County-level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, I use 
county-level per capita income and median household income from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and the percentage of democratic registered voters from the website of the Secretary of 
State of California. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the data used in this study.  
 
VII. Results 
A. Government Expenditures   
In this section, I present the results for the expenditure categories, and, to describe the 
findings, I interchangeably use the terms strategic interactions or spillover effects, as I have not 
explicitly made the case as to which mechanisms are likely to be relevant in the context of this 
study.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2 presents the results for general government 
expenditures, and there is a high degree of correlation between general expenditures of 
neighboring counties.  The point estimates are highly significant. Regarding how general 
spending from the previous year is related to spending in the following year, the point estimates 
are significant as well. Overall, this evidence suggest that county decision-makers, either citizens 
through referenda or elected officials, react positively to what their neighbors do. 
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In Table 2.3, I present the results for the public protection expenditures. Similar to 
general expenditures, there seems to be strong evidence of strategic interactions or spillover 
effects. The point estimates are significant at the 1% level, indicating strong evidence of 
spillover effects or strategic interactions.  If one were to speculate on the nature of this finding, it 
might be because an increase in police protection in one jurisdiction acts as a deterrence.  As a 
result of negative externalities, neighboring counties feel compelled to increase expenditures on 
police protection within their own borders. 
In Table 2.4, the results for expenditures on public facilities indicate a strong evidence of 
spillover effects or strategic interactions. One likely explanation for this finding is that local 
public facilities such as public parks and museums are often a local matter, and citizens can 
freely move to enjoy such benefits in a Tiebout type of environment where people vote with their 
feet, choosing their most preferred bundles of amenities. Neighboring counties respond 
accordingly. 
Finally, in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, I present the result for public assistance and expenditures, 
respectively. As we can see, the point estimates are not significant for either expenditure 
category. Interestingly, the point estimate for health expenditures is positive, while the one for 
public assistance is negative. Further, in terms of correlation between health and public 
assistance from the previous period. That there does not seem to be evidence of strategic 
interactions with respect to health and public assistance expenditures is reassuring for the overall 
findings in this section, given that health and public assistance expenditures are often determined 
at the state level, not at the county level. 
Thus far, the foregoing analysis shows strong evidence indicating that counties in 
California engage in fiscal interactions expenditure categories such as general expenditure, 
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public facilities, and public protection expenditures.  There is no evidence of fiscal interactions 
with respect to health and public assistance expenditures. Next, I turn to revenue categories. 
 
B. Government Revenues  
In this section, I attempt to shed light on spillover effects or strategic interactions from 
the revenue side of the public budget. As one can see from columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.7, it 
would seem that there is a high degree of fiscal interactions with respect to sales tax revenues.  
One likely explanation for this finding might have to do with the fact that county governments 
are restricted in amount of revenues that they can raise through the property tax due to 
Proposition 13; therefore, local governments turn to sales and use tax. Cross-border issues with 
respect to the sales tax are likely to be relevant within a state, as citizens can easily go to an 
adjacent county for their shopping needs. However, using data for a subset of large U.S. 
counties, Ladd (1992) finds no presence of strategic interactions in sales tax burden. 
Table 2.8 presents the results for revenues from transient tax and license tax. Recall that 
transient taxes are usually levied on hotels and motels (therefore on non-residents), one would 
therefor expect some such as tax on motels and hotels do not seem indicate any significant 
impact of tax referenda on change in revenue composition. One possible explanation for the 
findings with respect to transient tax might very good candidates to either use for competition or 
mimicking purposes given that the tax generally falls on non-resident. Also, the lagged variable 
is always positive, but only significant in Column (2).  This is in contrast to the lagged values for 
sales tax revenues, which are always significant.  
In Table 2.9, I present the findings for revenues from other taxes. Recall that other taxes 
exclude property tax and the other two revenue categories mentioned above (sales tax and 
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transient tax). Recall that revenues from other taxes exclude revenues from intergovernmental 
transfer from the state or the federal government. As we can see from columns (1) and (2) from 
Table 2.9, there is strong evidence of strategic interactions with respect to other tax revenues, as 
the estimated coefficients are highly significant. Also, the significance of the point estimates for 
the lagged variable implies that other tax revenues change slowly from year to year.  Overall, the 
strong evidence of strategic interactions related to  revenues at the local in California may have 
to do with the fact that Proposition 13 limits the amount of revenues that be raised through the 
property taxes, county governments therefore compete with one another along other revenue 
dimensions.   
To summarize, in this section, I have presented evidence indicating that counties in 
California engage in fiscal interactions through sales, transient and other tax revenues.9 
Interestingly, given the extensive use of local referenda in California counties, the findings with 
respect to revenue categories are in contrast to, say, Isen (2014), who finds no spillover effects,  
analyzing in local tax referenda in Ohio.  However, the findings are in line with a long line of 
research identifying the presence of strategic interactions with respect to either taxes, 
government revenues and expenditures both within and outside of the U.S., such as Hines and 
Rosen (1993), Besley and Case (1995), Figlio et al. (1999), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), 
Buettner (2003), Baicker (2005), Millimet and Rangaprasad (2006), Sole-Olle (2006), Dubois 
and Paty (2008), Gerard et al. (2010). 
 
                                                          
9 Just as the findings of no fiscal interactions with respect to health and public assistance expenditures 
serve in some sense as a robustness check for the expenditure side of the budget, with respect to revenue 
categories, perhaps it might be useful to show that there are no fiscal interactions related to property tax 
revenues, as we should probably expect, given that counties are generally limited in the amount of 
revenues that they can raise through property tax. 
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VIII. Conclusion  
The purpose of this second dissertation chapter has been to shed light on the extent to 
which fiscal spillovers exist at the county level, analyzing county expenditure and revenue data 
in California from 2003 to 2013. One noteworthy aspect of this study is that fiscal decisions in 
California counties are often made through the use of tax referenda. Past theoretical models have 
hypothesized on a number of ways strategic interactions might arise.  First, strategic interactions 
might take place due to expenditure and revenue mimicking, whereby counties simply replicate 
or imitate the expenditure and revenue patterns of their neighbors. Second, strategic interactions 
might be due to Yardstick competition, as citizens or voters take into account fiscal choices in 
neighboring jurisdiction in judging the performance of their elected officials. Third, due to 
spillover benefits or externalities, fiscal decisions in one jurisdiction might spread to other 
jurisdictions.  
Overall, I have found a high degree of fiscal interactions among neighboring 
jurisdictions. With respect to expenditure categories, general expenditures, public protection, 
public facilities expenditures show evidence of fiscal slipovers. On the tax side, revenues from 
sales, transient and other taxes exhibit a high degree of fiscal interactions as well.  Overall, with 
very few exceptions, the findings of this dissertation chapter are in line with most studies most 
studies in the literature. 
I acknowledge some shortcomings of this study. One possible limitation of this study and 
by extension of a sizable strand of the fiscal interaction literature is that there is a theoretical 
literature that hypothesizes that government expenditures and revenues are interdependent by 
nature (Meltzer and Richard 1981). That is, investigating strategic interactions by analyzing 
 49 
 
separate equations for expenditures and revenues might not tell the whole story. Hence, one 
possible avenue for further research might be to analyze the two sides of the budgets together.  
Also, although this study is carried out in the context of direct democracy,  in the sense 
that the extensive use of county referenda is likely to directly impact fiscal choices, I have not 
explicitly made the case that the  strong  evidence  of  strategic interactions are due in large 
measure to the local initiative.  Finally, there are methodological limitations as well. Specifically, 
as mentioned in section V, there are several ways to carry out the empirical methodologies, and it 
might be appropriate to use the instrumental variable approach used in the literature, given the 
muluiticolnieaity issues with the GMM approach.  Also, somewhat relatedly, future research 
might gauge the robustness of the findings using different weighting matrix schemes.   
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Chapter III Impact of Alternative Education Programs on Juvenile Crime 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
School suspension and school expulsion, broadly defined as time students spend out of 
school for disciplinary problems, have been a concern in the U.S. for at least the last two 
decades. More than one hundred thousand students were expelled from schools in the 2004-2005 
school year (Carroll 2008). Many of the expelled and suspended students do not have access to 
public education and will not return back to school (Carroll 2008).  Unfortunately, this issue has 
been hard to study because there is a dearth of datasets that tracks school suspension and 
expulsion overtime.  School suspension in New York is typical of many places in the country: 
“The total number of suspensions in New York City grew at an alarming rate over the last 
decade: One out of every 14 students was suspended in 2008-2009; in 1999-2000 it was one in 
25. In 2008-2009, this added up to more than 73,000 suspensions.”10  Furthermore, as Losen and 
Skiba (2013, p.3) report, “A review of national suspension rates since the early 70’s for K-12 
public schools reveals a substantial increase in the use of suspension for students of all races, as 
well as a concomitant increase in the racial discipline gap.” 
Two relatively recent federal programs related to education are believed to have 
adversely impacted school suspension and school expulsion. First, the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act (1994), passed by congress to prevent gun violence in schools, has led  school districts to 
                                                          
10http://www.nyclu.org/publications/report-education-interrupted-growing-use-of-suspensions-new-york-
citys-public-schools-. Accessed, October 2013. 
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implement various zero tolerance policy laws, allowing schools to expulse students for various 
school violations,  even for first-time and minor school transgressions.11 As recently as March 6, 
2012, the New York Times reports, “In recent decades, as more districts and states have adopted 
zero tolerance policies, imposing mandatory suspension for a wide range of behavioral misdeeds, 
more and more students have been sent away from school for at least a few days, an approach 
that is often questioned as paving the way for students to fall behind and drop out.”   
Second, certain aspects of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001 are 
likely to have exacerbated this increase in school expulsion. The NCLBA constrains schools 
districts across the nation to comply with the federal requirement that all of their students reach 
100% proficiency in both reading and math, as measured by standardized test scores by 2014. 
Schools that fail to make adequate progress toward satisfying the federal requirement may face 
consequences, such as school closing, school district board intervention, or students moving to 
other schools. One way of avoiding some of the harsh consequences of the NCLBA might be to 
exclude low performing students from standardized test scores through an increase in school 
suspension and expulsion, thereby increasing average school test scores to meet the federal 
requirement (Carroll 2008).  Moreover, Figlio (2006) presents evidence showing that schools in 
Florida do engage in disciplinary practices in order to increase aggregate test performance and 
therefore avoid punishment from school districts. 
School suspension and expulsion have been mentioned as contributing factors to an 
increase in the so-called school-to-prison pipeline.12According to a recent report from the New 
                                                          
11 To quote Carroll (2008), “An antidrug zero tolerance policy led a high school to expel a student for 
possession of Advil, an over-the-counter pain reliever. At another school, a boy was expelled for landing 
his inhaler to his girlfriend when she had an asthma attack. A fifth grader was expelled after telling a 
teacher about the paring knife that her mother accidentally put in her lunch box.” 
12See the editorial of the New York Times (May 30, 2013). 
 52 
 
York City School-Justice Partnership Task Force, school suspension and expulsion have led to 
an increase in the arrests of school age children, as they are reported to the authority for charges 
for which “there is often no underlying criminal behavior.”13 Further, a recent report by the 
Florida-based advocacy group, the Children’s Campaign, indicates, “In 2008, there were over 1.6 
million youth whose cases were disposed in juvenile courts across the country.” Therefore, as 
more students are being suspended, expulsed and referred to the authorities, more students spend 
more time out of school. There is an economics literature linking physically being out of school 
to juvenile crime (Witte and Tauchen 1994; Lefgren 2003; Luallen 2006).  
Due to concern over the impact of school suspensions and expulsions, between 1987 to 
2010, several U.S. states adopted policies that mandate school districts to establish alternative 
education programs for expelled and suspended students. Using county juvenile arrest data from 
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports and state homicide victimization and homicide offending data 
from the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR), I estimate the impact of state-mandated 
alternative education programs for suspended and expelled students on juvenile crime.  More 
specifically, using the county and state panel data, along with an extensive set of economic and 
demographic control variables, I conduct difference-in-differences and event study estimations 
of the effect of state alternative education mandate on juvenile crime.  
School expulsion and suspension might lead students to engage in undesirable societal 
behavior, including school dropout, low academic achievement, and juvenile crime and 
incarceration. Proponents of state-mandated alternative education programs argue that those 
programs might mitigate some of those perverse incentives, helping students with their school 
assignments so that they do not fall behind when they are reinstated in school. Moreover, 
                                                          
13http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/justiceforchildren/school-justice.shtml#NYCpartnership.Accessed, October 
2013. 
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education is correlated with a host of good and desirable societal behavior (Usher 1997; Lochner 
2004, 2010).  
This paper contributes to the existing literature measuring the impact of contemporaneous 
schooling on crime in at least the following two important ways. First, I use the state mandate as 
a proxy for school attendance for the suspended and expelled students and estimate its impact on 
juvenile crime. Therefore, this essay is closely related to the literature on contemporaneous 
schooling on crime, such as Jacob and Lefgren (2003), Luallen (2006), and Akee et al. (2014), 
among others, who estimate the impact of physically being out of school on juvenile crime. 
Second, this essay is also related to the literature examining the impact of human capital 
accumulation on crime, as students in states with alternative education mandate might not drop 
out of the school system. Thus, alternative education might not only affect juvenile crime in the 
short term  by facilitating school-age children to remain in school during the suspension period, 
but also in the long term through an increase in school completion or a prevention in school 
dropout, thereby increasing future wages. 
In what follows, using county crime data, I present the findings of this study, indicating 
that state-mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students seems to 
have no significant impact on juvenile crime (total crime, violent crime and property crime and 
several types of violent and property crime). Most of the point estimates of the effects of those 
programs are negative.  This seems to persist under alternative econometric specifications. 
However, using state level homicide offending and victimization data for several age 
groups and by race, I find no evidence of any significant effect of those programs on either 
juvenile homicide victimization or homicide offending rates of all youth between the ages of 12 
and 17, except for black youth  between the same ages.  This finding might be due to the fact that 
 54 
 
African-American students are suspended from school at a higher rate than their white 
counterparts. In fact, as the Washington Post reported in March 2014, “In the 1972-73 school 
year, suspension rates were 6 percent for whites and 12 percent for African-Americans at the 
secondary school level. The most recent federal figures, for 2009-2010, show rates of 7 percent 
for whites and 24 percent for African Americans in those grades.” That is, black students are 
now over three times more likely than white students to be suspended from schools (Losen and 
Skiba 2013). This finding is largely in line with the incapacitation effect of alternative education 
programs, whereby students that are enrolled in those programs cannot be in the streets during 
the period of instruction.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background 
information on state-mandated alternative education programs. Section III outlines the expected 
effects of state- mandated alternative education programs on juvenile crime. Section IV presents 
the econometric specification. Section V describes the data and summary statistics. Section VI 
presents the results. The last section concludes and discusses the results. 
 
II. State-mandated alternative education programs 
This section briefly describes how alternative education programs work. In fact, there are 
several types of alternative education programs, such as alternative education programs targeted 
to students with disabilities. However, the main focus of this essay is related to “disciplinary 
alternative education programs for at-risk students who have disciplinary problems” (Texas 
Education Agency 2007). Alternative education programs for suspended and expelled students 
have two primary goals. “The first goal is to provide temporary student placements for behavior 
management, often as alternatives to suspension and expulsion. The goal is for students to return 
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to, and succeed in their regularly assigned classroom” (Texas Education Agency 2007). The 
second goal is to help facilitate the reinsertion of expelled and suspended students in the school 
environment, as they do not fall behind in their academic studies upon returning to school. 
In general, the functioning of state-mandated alternative education programs varies by 
state. For example, in California, every expelled student has the right to an education. Upon 
expulsion, the school district must provide educational programs to the expelled students for the 
entire period of expulsion. In addition, “A school district has discretion to use alternatives to 
suspension and expulsion, such as counseling, anger-management programs, and community 
service during non-school hours.”  Delaware and Illinois serve students in grade 6-12, with some 
5th graders as well. The Mississippi law applies to “Any compulsory school age child, who has 
been suspended for more than ten (10) days or expelled from school, except for any students 
expelled for possession of a weapon or other felonious conduct.” The Nebraska law applies to 
“all expelled students.” In North Carolina, “Some districts try to serve all grade levels, but the 
usual grade spans are 6-12 and 9-12.”  Rhode Island law §16-21-27 requires that “Each school 
district shall adopt a plan to ensure continued education of students who are removed from the 
classroom because of a suspension of more than ten (10) days or who are chronically truant.” 
Overall, most states which mandate alternative education programs allow those programs to 
serve students in higher grade level, students who are more likely to drop out of the school 
system (Carroll 2008). California and Texas have two of the most comprehensive alternative 
education programs, requiring school districts to keep detailed record of students enrolled in an 
alternative education program. 
In the states that mandate alternative education programs, school districts are required to 
have alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students, and, in some cases, 
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students may chose not to participate. In Texas, for example, expelled and suspended students 
are required to take part in alternative education programs (Texas Education Agency 2007). It is 
not clear whether students have to participate in some other states. Lacking this information, the 
main focus here is on the right to education of the expelled and suspended students in the states 
with alternative education mandate. But there is diversity across states. For example, in Utah, the 
law makes it expressly the responsibility of parents to educate their children if they are 
suspended or expelled from school.14 
In most states which mandate alternative education programs, to get information on the 
number of students enrolled in alternative education programs, one would need to contact each 
school district or school system. For example, in North Carolina, even though alternative 
education programs have been in place since at least before 1993, I was told, only very recently 
has the state begun tracking the progress of those programs.  However, given the increase in size 
in the number of students expelled and suspended over the years at the state level, one can fairly 
assume that a sizable number of those students found themselves in alternative environment 
settings across the country.  
To my knowledge, there is not that much information regarding the number of students 
enrolled in alternative education programs, given that those programs are administered mostly at 
the local level. There is no empirical evidence on whether alternative education programs are 
effective in preventing juvenile crime.  Alternative education programs for expelled and 
suspended students might exist in school districts without the state mandate. For example, 
Florida does not mandate alternative education programs at the state level, but a number of 
school districts have alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students. 
                                                          
14  Utah Code Section 53A-11-907. 
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However, in the school districts in the states without alternative education mandate, it is probably 
more a matter of local school board discretion whether or not expelled students are allowed to be 
enrolled in those programs.  
 
III. Related Literature and Conceptual Framework 
The economics literature measuring the impact of alternative education programs on 
juvenile crime is practically non-existent. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that 
empirically measures the impact of state-mandated alternative education programs for expelled 
and suspended students on juvenile crime. However, there is a well-developed economics 
literature on the impact of educational attainment on crime (Lochner and Moretti 2004; 
Hjalmarsson 2008; Buonanno and Leonida 2009; Machin, Marie, and Vujic 2011), school 
quality on crime (Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006; Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig 2009; Deming 
2011), and school attendance on crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Luallen 2006; Anderson 
2012).15 
Lochner and Moretti (2004) examine the impact of educational attainment on crime rates 
in states in the U.S., using changes in state compulsory schooling laws as instruments for 
education, finding the probability of incarceration decreases with schooling; Oreopolous and 
Salvanes (2009) find an additional year of schooling leads to a decrease in the incarceration of 
black males by 20% in U.S. states. 
The impact of contemporaneous education on crime has been studied by Anderson 
(2012), using state-level variation in the minimum drop out age to find a negative impact of 
contemporaneous education  on both violent and property crimes at the county level from 1990 
                                                          
15 See Lochner (2010) for an excellent review of this literature. 
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to 2008 in the U.S.; Jacob and Lefgren (2003) present evidence on how teacher in-service days 
leads to an increase in violent crime and a decrease in property crime in selected cities in the 
U.S.; Luallen (2006) finds school closing (teacher strikes) increases violent crime and decreases 
property crime  in the state of Washington. 
As noted above, this is the first study to estimate the impact of state-mandated alternative 
education programs for suspended and expelled students on juvenile crime. However, there is a 
well-developed theoretical and empirical literature linking time out of school to criminal 
activities. In light of both the findings and the predictions of that literature, a priori it is uncertain 
regarding both the sign and the magnitude of what the eventual impact of those programs on 
juvenile criminal activities may be. Past theoretical models have identified several channels 
through which education attainment and/or contemporaneous education might have an impact on 
criminal activities. The first channel might be through the incapacitation effect, whereby students 
that are enrolled in alternative education programs cannot be engaged in both out-of-school 
criminal and in-school educational activities at the same time. In that regard, alternative 
education programs could probably be effective in preventing expelled students from engaging in 
criminal activities, as students that are enrolled in those programs would be off the streets.  Jacob 
and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006), for example, find that time students spend out of school 
leads to an increase in property crime in Washington and selected cities in the U.S.  
The second channel through which state-mandated alternative education programs might 
impact juvenile criminal activities is related to human capital accumulation (Becker 1964; Ben-
Porath 1967). In particular, human capital accumulation increases employment prospects 
(Lochner 2004). With respect to alternative education programs, human capital accumulation 
would be helping students during the period of suspension and expulsion, possibly preventing 
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school dropout.  In contrast to the short term impact of the incapacitation effect of 
contemporaneous schooling on juvenile crime, the human capital effect would take place in the 
long term, as alternative education programs may help increase high school completion and years 
of schooling, which, in turn, would lead to an increase in future labor market wages and a 
decrease in future criminal activities [Samson and Laub 1993, 1997]. State-mandated alternative 
education programs have been in place long enough to influence juvenile criminal activities 
through human capital accumulation. Both the incapacitation and the human capital effects 
suggest that alternative education programs should lead to a decrease in juvenile crime 
Third, alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students may impact 
juvenile criminal activities through social interaction (Glaeser et al. 1996, 2003). That is, at-risk 
students might misbehave in an alternative education environment while interacting with other 
students, but once removed from the school environment through suspension or expulsion, those 
at-risk students might no longer misbehave. A forecast based on theoretical models of social 
interaction would therefore imply that state-mandated alternative education programs should 
have no significant effect on juvenile criminal activities. This theoretical prediction would seem 
to be supported by anecdotal evidence suggesting that most students that are being expelled or 
suspended from schools are not criminals per se given that the infractions for which they are 
often expelled may be many times trivial or at least no major offense.  
Fourth, another closely related facet to social interaction is the concentration effect of 
contemporaneous schooling, whereby school interaction serves as a gathering place for 
delinquent students to plan their engagement in criminal activities.  A rather large and related 
empirical literature on the influence of peer effects on juvenile behavior supports this hypothesis. 
Given that alternative education programs in general serve students that are expelled and 
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suspended from school and thus have a track record of delinquent behavior, the concentration 
effect of those programs, combined with peer pressure, would probably lead to an increase in 
juvenile criminal activities. Moreover, as Anderson (2014) points out, “Keeping children in 
school increases the number of potential interactions that facilitate delinquency, especially 
physical altercations.” In that regard, for example, both Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen 
(2006) report that the time students spend in school actually leads to an increase in violent crime 
in selected US cities and cities in the state of Washington, respectively.  
 Ultimately, then, the incapacitation, human capital accumulation and social interaction 
and/or concentration effects of contemporaneous schooling imply that the impact of state-
mandated alternative education programs on juvenile crime at least from a theoretical perspective 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the incapacitation and the human capital accumulation effects 
suggest that alternative education programs should lead to a decrease in juvenile crime, while, on 
the other hand, the social interaction/and concentration effects suggest either an increase or a 
decrease or no effect of state-mandated alternative education on juvenile crime. This theoretical 
ambiguity is further complicated by the fact that detailed information over time on the 
characteristics of the expelled students is not available. Therefore, in light of this brief overview, 
the impact of state-mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students 
on juvenile crime is mostly an empirical question, which I address next.   
IV. Empirical Specification 
In the empirical estimation, I adopt two complementary strategies. First, I use a standard 
difference-in-differences methodology where I use a dummy indicator for the year the state 
mandate went into effect and the years afterwards. Second, I adopt an event-study methodology 
where I relax the assumption of the difference-in-differences, allowing the state mandate to have 
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an impact on juvenile crime five years after its implementation. This second approach is justified 
by the fact that those programs are administered at the school district level; hence, school 
districts administrators might have different timeline in terms of when they implement those 
programs. With the difference-in-differences, I assume that the impact of the state mandate on 
juvenile crime is static; however, alternative education programs might take a while to be put in 
place, especially at the school district level. Initial effects might be large and then disappear. 
That is, short run effects may differ from long run effects.   
 
A. Difference-in-Differences 
First, to measure the overall impact of state-mandated alternative education programs on 
juvenile crime at the county level, I specify the following difference-in-differences model:   
 
(3.1)                              𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡   =   𝐵1𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑠𝑡    +    𝛽2𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡  +   𝜎𝑐   +    𝜃𝑡     +    𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡,  
 
where   𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡   indicates the outcome of interest, juvenile arrests rate per 100,000 of the juvenile 
population in county c in state s at time t,  𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡 is a set of county-level economic and 
demographic variables that are commonly used in the economics literature linking education to 
criminal activities, such as median household income, income per capita, average earnings per  
job,  unemployment rate, and the percentage of the population under the poverty level; 
   𝜎𝑐    and     𝜃𝑡     are, respectively, county fixed-effects and year effects. Specification 1.1 
includes county fixed effects to account for fixed county characteristics that may correlate with 
juvenile crime activities; that is, differences between different types of counties or time-invariant 
 62 
 
measures related to education policies at the county level will not confound the estimates. The 
year fixed effects account for aggregate time-varying shocks such as economic conditions and 
changes in education policies at the state and/or the national level. 
𝐵1, the coefficient of interest, is a dummy indicator measuring the impact of state-
mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students on juvenile crime.  
Throughout the empirical analysis, I cluster the estimated standard errors at the state level to 
account for serial correlation, within-state spatial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The basic 
assumption for identification of Equation 3.1 is that of a parallel trend in the outcome variable, 
juvenile crime. That is, without state alternative education mandate, juvenile crime in counties in 
states with and without the mandate would have followed a similar trend. Endogeneity of 
alternative education mandate might lead to violation of this assumption. However, based on the 
wording of the laws, it does not appear that juvenile crime was the primary concern for the 
implementation of alternative education mandate. In addition, the event study methodology 
presented below provides support to the notion that endogeneity of the state mandate is not a 
concern in this study.  
 
B. Event Study Analysis 
Second, to flexibly estimate the impact of alternative education mandate on juvenile 
crime, I specify the following event study model: 
 
(3.2)                  𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡   =   ∑ 𝐵𝜎(𝐴𝑙𝑡𝜎,𝑐𝑠𝑡
5
𝜎=−2 = 1)    +    𝛾𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡   +     𝜃𝑗        +    𝛼𝑡     +    𝜀𝑐𝑠𝑡 , 
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where  𝑦𝑐𝑠𝑡  is the outcome of interest for county c in state s at time t ;     𝜃𝑗    and    𝛼𝑡   are  
county and year  fixed-effects, respectively; 𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡  is a vector of county-specific characteristics, 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝜎,𝑐𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable equaling one in the year that state s mandates that schools 
districts or school system establish alternative education programs for expelled and suspended 
students.  𝐴𝑙𝑡4,𝑐𝑠𝑡 means that county c is in a state that mandated alternative education programs 
4 years ago, while 𝐴𝑙𝑡−4,𝑐𝑠𝑡 means that county c is in a state that will mandate alternative 
education programs 4 years later. The year prior to the state mandate is the omitted category. The 
indexing from σ = -2 to  σ  = 5 indicates state-mandated alternative education programs are 
analyzed here five years pre and post-policy. Specification (3.2) allows one to see how juvenile 
crime evolves leading up to the state mandate, and how they change and evolve following the 
state mandate. 
In some estimations of the model, following Anderson (2014), I also include a set of state 
specific linear trends to control for time series variation within each state. The  𝑋𝑐𝑠𝑡  is a vector 
of  the usual variables that past researchers have controlled for in the economics literature 
measuring the impact of education on crime, such as county level median household income, 
unemployment rate, income per capita and the percentage of the population under the poverty 
level, among other variables. 
The coefficients of interest, the  𝐵𝜎 vector, are identified under the assumption that, in the 
absence of state alternative education mandate, juvenile crime would have a similar trend in 
counties in the states that mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended 
students at different times. As is common in the economics literature measuring the impact of 
contemporaneous schooling on criminal activities such as in Anderson (2012), with 
Specifications 3.1 and 3.2, I am not capturing nuances in the laws regarding state alternative 
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education mandate but the overall and dynamic impact of the mandate on juvenile crime, 
respectively. For example, there is variation in the laws regarding what happens to expelled 
students who commit infractions while already being placed in an alternative education 
environment.   
 
V. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To carry out the analysis, I use three main sources of data: information on the dates when 
state mandated-alternative education programs were put into place, county level juvenile arrest 
data, and state level homicide victimizations and offending data.  For the first source of data, I 
have collected the dates of alternative education mandates by e-mail correspondence with school 
officials from the departments of education in all the 50 states in the U.S. All the e-mails are 
available upon request. In the e-mails that I sent requesting information on alternative education 
programs, I ask the following question: “Does your state have an alternative education program 
for expelled and/or suspended students, and, if so, has there been any change over the years in 
the implementation of the program?”  I have all the dates the following states mandate that 
school districts or school systems establish alternative education programs for expelled and/or 
suspended students [ California (1995),  Colorado (1997), Delaware (1994), Hawaii (2005), 
Illinois (1996),  Minnesota (1987),  Mississippi (2005),   Nebraska (1997),  New York (2004),   
North Carolina (<1993),  Oregon (2001),   Rhode Island (2004),  Tennessee (1992) and  Texas 
(1995)].16  I exclude the following states because they have mandated alternative education 
                                                          
16 California: CAL. EDC. CODE EC §§ 48916.1, 48915(f).Colorado: e-mail correspondence, “Statute 
requires school districts to offer to parents of expelled students the available options for alternative 
education while expelled.”  Connecticut: Public Act 10-111, amending subsection (g) of the Connecticut 
General Statutes, by adding the following provision effective July 1, 2010; “Suspension pursuant to this 
section shall be in school…” Delaware: 
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programs only very recently: Connecticut (2010), Louisiana (2012), Massachusetts (2014). 
California and Colorado are the only states that explicitly make the distinction between expelled 
and suspended students, allowing alternative education programs only for expelled students. 
Under California law, for example, school districts have the prerogatives to provide educational 
services to suspended students. Unfortunately, most states do not keep track of the number of 
expelled and suspended students enrolled in those programs. 
For the second source of data, the main variable of interest is juvenile crime or arrests at 
the county level.  Counts of juvenile arrests at the county level were collected through the 
detailed arrest county-level data provided by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports and were 
gathered from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD), part of the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.  
I use juvenile arrests for all counties in the U.S. from 1997 to 2010. Juvenile arrests are 
not available for the state of Florida, and limited data are available for Illinois.  Those two states 
are therefore excluded from the analysis. In Table 3.1, among other variables, I present summary 
statistics for juvenile arrest rates for total crime and several crime categories from 1997 to 2010 
                                                          
http://delcode.delaware.gov/sessionlaws/ga137/chp464.shtml.Hawaii:http://www.hawaiiboe.net/policies/
2100series/Pages/2131.aspx. Illinois: 105 ILCS 5/13A-0.5. Louisiana: 
http://legis.la.gov/lss/lss.asp?doc=81034. Massachusetts: (Chapter 222, of the Acts of 2011; or “Law’), 
the “Law” takes effect on July 1, 2014.  Minnesota: 124D.68. Mississippi: section 37-13-92 of the 
Mississippi Code. Nebraska: STATUTORYAUTHORITY 79-318, 79-266; CODE SECTION 001-005. 
North Carolina: e-mail correspondence “Yes, all school districts are required to have alternative 
education for at-risk students. Alternative schools go back at least twenty years, but state standards for 
ALPs are less than ten years old.  This usually includes services for expelled and suspended students.” 
Oregon: ORS 336.615. Rhode Island: R.I.G.L. 16-21-27. Tennessee:  “In 1992, the General Assembly 
mandated that one alternative school be established for each local school district to serve suspended and 
expelled youth.” Texas: e-mail correspondence “Yes Texas has a state policy that all districts must have a 
Disciplinary Alternative Education Program in place. Legislation was passed in 1995. Ages 6 and up.”   
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per 100,000 of the at-risk population.17 The juvenile arrest data are reported by agency within a 
county for several types of crimes, classified as either violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault) or property crimes (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and arson). Counts 
of juvenile arrests are aggregated at the county level. Since reporting is voluntary, counties with 
a small number of people tend to report zero count of juvenile arrests. Hence, in those cases, it is 
impossible to distinguish a true zero from a non-reporting zero.  However, the data were 
distributed with a coverage indicator, which “provides a diagnostic measure of aggregated data 
quality in a particular county.”  
One important limitation in using juvenile crime data in general is that the FBI does not 
distribute reported crime data for juveniles. Only when the police have made an arrest do we 
have information on juvenile arrests. I therefore follow the literature by using juvenile arrests as 
a proxy for juvenile crime (e.g. Anderson 2012; Larsen 2013). Admittedly, this is not a perfect 
measure of juvenile criminal behavior; however, using the UCR data, Lochner and Moretti 
(2004) find a very high correlation between arrests and crimes committed (Anderson 2012).  
I control for county level unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, median 
household income and various county-level poverty estimates such as the share of the county 
population between the ages of 10 and 17 and total county population under the poverty level, 
real income per capita and county average earnings per jobs from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  
Demographic control variables such as the percentage of the black population that is 
between the ages of 10 and 17 come from the National Center for Juvenile Justice of the Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).  
                                                          
17 Puzzanchera, C., Sladky, A. and Kang, W. (2013). "Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-2012." 
Online: http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/. Accessed, January 15-19, 2014. 
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As already mentioned, one shortcoming in using the county juvenile arrest data is that 
there is a high incidence of counties that report zero count of juvenile arrests. I therefore turn to 
other sources of data such as state level homicide victimizations and homicide offending from 
the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR). Even though most empirical studies in the 
literature investigating the impact of education in general on juvenile criminal activities make 
use of counts of juvenile arrest from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Series, Weiner et al. (2009) use 
homicide offending and victimizations from the SHR to estimate the effect of school 
desegregation on crime, arguing that the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports have a great deal of 
measurement error.  
Alternatively, then,  I investigate the impact of the state mandate using state level crime 
data from the SHR to capture information on juvenile homicide victimizations, and, when police 
have made an arrest, homicide offending.  Homicide victimizations and offending data for more 
than 7 years are missing for Florida, Kansas, Montana and Nebraska; those four states are not 
therefore included in the analysis. I control for a rich set of state level variables such as 
unemployment rate, income inequality, income per capita, median income, state population, and 
poverty and minimum wage rates. 
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for the state crime data that I use in the analysis. It 
consists of 46 states, excluding the four states mentioned above due to missing data on homicide 
offending and victimizations for more than 7 years over the study period (1994-2010). Homicide 
offending rates for all juveniles aged 12-17 and for black juveniles aged 12-17 are, respectively, 
12.24 and 17.44, per 100,000 of the corresponding at-risk population. That is, for instance, 17.44 
is the homicide offending rate for black youth between the ages of 12 and 17.  Similarly, 
homicide victimization rates to youth 12-14, 15-17 and their black counterparts are 1.07,  5.40,  
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2.78   and 19.23 per 100,000 for the respective at-risk population. As one can see from Table 2, 
both homicide offending and homicide victimization rates are higher for black youth.  
 
VI. Results  
Table 3 shows the main results of this study using the difference-in-differences 
Specification 1.1. The dependent variables are county-level juvenile arrest rates per 100,000 of 
the juvenile population that is between the ages of 10 and 17. The baseline model includes a set 
of county and year fixed effects along with a set of demographic and economic control variables. 
Columns (1) thorough (3) show the findings for total crime, violent crime and property crime, 
respectively. As one can see from Table 3, the point estimates are negative across all three 
dependent variables, but none of them are significant.  As a robustness check, columns (4) 
through (6) of Table 3 include a set of state specific linear time trends to account for time series 
variation within each state, and the point estimates are somewhat similar to the ones from 
columns (1) through (3), except for violent crime which, though still insignificant, becomes 
positive. Overall, state-mandated alternative education programs do not seem to have a 
significant impact on juvenile crime.  
In this section, as is common in the literature, I replace the dependent variable, juvenile 
arrest rate, with its log and proceed with the analysis as before. I start with the simplest model 
and progressively include the set of demographic and economic variables along with county and 
year fixed- effects. Table 4 presents the results for the full specification of the model. None of 
the coefficients for the state mandate indicate a statistically significant impact of alternative 
education programs on either total crime, property crime or violent crime. Therefore, based on 
the combined evidence from juvenile arrest rates in Table 3 and the log linear model from Table 
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4, I conclude that state-mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended 
students do not significantly impact overall juvenile crime level at the county level. In addition, 
as shown in columns (4) through (6) of Table 4, the results are not sensitive to the addition of 
state specific linear time trends. Overall, these results are in line with Akee et al. (2014) who find 
no impact of time out of school on overall juvenile arrests in the state of Hawaii, except for 
assault and drug-related arrests.  
 
A. Results by Offense Type  
I now turn to investigate the impact of state-mandated alternative education programs on 
juvenile crime with respect to the breakdown of different types of crimes. Table 5 presents the 
results for four categories of violent crime (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) while 
Table 6 presents the results for four categories of property crimes (burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft and arson). Overall, there seems to be no significant impact of the state mandate on 
either violent crime or the property crime categories, even though the point estimates are all 
negative. Notwithstanding issues of aggregation that are common in the crime literature where 
aggregate results differ from individual results due to measurement error and the ways in which 
categories of violent crime and property crime are recorded, the fact that the point estimates have 
the same signs, though insignificant, imply that alternative education programs probably have a 
strong incapacitation effect.  For instance, Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Lullallen (2006) find 
that time in school lead to an increase in violent crime. In addition, a rather large strand of the 
peer effects literature such as Gaviria and Raphael (2001), finding evidence of peer-group 
influence to engage in drug use, alcohol drinking, cigarette smoking, church going, and the 
likelihood to drop out of high school. That is, since an alternative education environment brings 
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together students that already have a history of unruly behavior, through peer-group influence, 
those students might have been more likely to engage in criminal activities.  This does not 
happen to be the case in this study. 
B. Dynamic Effects 
In this section, I present the results from estimating the dynamic responses of the juvenile 
arrests to the adoption of state-mandated alternative education programs using Specification 1.2. 
Recall that here I replace the indicator variable for the state mandate with a set of dummy 
indicators, Year -2 through Years +5, which indicate one-year interval before and after the 
alternative education laws were enacted. Table 7 presents the results, and, as before, the 
specification includes a full set of control variables, county and year fixed-effects. The estimates 
for the dummy indicators just prior to the year the state mandate went into effect are insignificant 
for either total crime, violent crime or property crime. I therefore take this as an indication that 
policy endogeneity is not a serious concern. Overall, the signs and the significance of the point 
estimates do not seem to change under alternative specifications, i.e., controlling for state 
specific linear time trends. To summarize, the results of this event study analysis imply that 
endogeneity of the state mandate is not a concern in this study and that the state mandate does 
not have an impact on juvenile crime.  
As I did with the difference-in-differences specification, I then turn to the dynamic 
response of the state mandate on juvenile crime using the logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent variable. Tables 8 present the results for total crime, property crime and violent crime, 
and columns (1) through (3) largely confirm the findings presented in Table 7, indicating that 
alternative education mandate does not have any significant impact on either total crime, violent 
crime or property crime around the time the policy went into effect. However, looking at a longer 
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horizon, there seems to be a small significant but positive impact of alternative education 
programs on juvenile crime four years after the law went into effect. This could be due to 
measurement error issues that are inherent in county crime data. 
Similar to the evidence presented above using Specification 1.1, in Table 9, I analyze the 
impact of the state mandate on categories of property and violent crimes in a dynamic stetting, 
using Specification (1.2). I start with a simple econometric specification and progressively 
include a set of demographic and economic variables along with county and fixed-year effects. 
Tables 9 and 10 present show the results for categories of violent and property crimes, 
respectively. As one can see from columns (1) through (4) of Table 9, overall, it would seem that 
there is no significant impact of state-mandated alternative education programs on property 
crime. The results are not sensitive to adding a set of state specific linear time trends. Columns 
(1) through (4) from Table 10 present similar results for property crime categories. To 
summarize the overall results presented up to this point, alternative education mandates do not 
seem to have a significant impact on juvenile arrest rate at the county level in the U.S. To 
reiterate, notwithstanding issues of measurement errors in county-level crime data, by and large, 
the event-study methodology provides support for the results of the difference-in-differences. 
These results are broadly in line with Akee et al. (2014) who find no impact of furloughing 
public school teachers on juvenile crime in the state of Hawaii from 2007 to 2010.  
 
C. State-Level Evidence: Juvenile Homicide Offending  
As already mentioned, the analysis of the county juvenile arrest data suggests that state 
mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students have no 
significant impact on juvenile crime, although most of the point estimates are negative. County-
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level crime data in general suffer from a large degree of measurement error. To gain further 
insight about this issue, I examine the impact of state-mandated alternative education mandates 
on juvenile crime using state-level crime data.  I turn to the analysis of juvenile homicide 
offending. This is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, using the county level data, I 
investigate the impact of the state mandate on crimes committed by juveniles between the ages 
of 10 and 17, while most juvenile crimes are committed by juveniles who are between the ages 
of 14 and 17 (Dills and Hernandez-Julian 2011).  The state-level data will allow me to analyze 
the impact of the state mandate on several age groups. Second, African-American students, along 
with Hispanics, are suspended at a higher rate than their white counterparts. The state-level data 
will also allow me to investigate whether there is heterogeneous treatment effect with respect to 
race.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 present the results for all youth and black youth between 
the ages of 12 and 17, respectively,  using Specification 1.1. The model includes an extensive set 
of demographic and economic control variables. Columns (3) through (4) control for a set of 
state specific linear time trends to account for within state time-series variation, and the 
coefficient for black youth become significant.  Overall, there does not seem to be a significant 
impact of alternative education mandate on juvenile homicide offending, except for black youth. 
To conclude, even though the results in this section are not directly comparable to the ones in the 
previous section since the juvenile county data are no broken down by race, the point estimates 
have the signs. 
In this section, I investigate the dynamic impact of the state mandate on juvenile 
homicide offending, using Specification 1.2. I start with a simple specification and progressively 
introduce a richer set of control variables, along with state and year fixed-effects. Table 12 
presents the results for this dynamic methodology using a set of dummy indicators for three 
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years after the policy took place. As we can see from column (2) of Table 12, the significant 
impact for black youth continues two years after the state mandate took effect. Controlling for 
state trends in column (4) of Table 12, the effect for black youth is even more pronounced one 
and two years after the policy took effect, while there seems to be a small but significant 
negative impact for all youth three years after the implementation of the program. Based on this 
evidence, one can conclude that state-mandated alternative education programs have led to a 
significant reduction in state-level homicide offending rates for black youth aged 12-17. This 
result is probably due to the incapacitation effect of those programs. 
 
D. State-Level Evidence: Juvenile Homicide Victimizations 
So far, the state homicide offending data suggest that there is a significant impact of 
state-mandated alternative education programs for expelled and suspended students on homicide 
offending rates of black youth.  However, one shortcoming of the homicide offending data is that 
only when a criminal is apprehended by the police does this information show up in the data.  To 
mitigate this problem, I turn to state homicide victimizations, where I analyze the impact of the 
state mandate on homicide victims. Thus, even if an offender has not been apprehended by the 
police, we would still presumably have information about criminal activities, providing that 
information about the victims have been reported, which seems very likely. As before, the data 
will also allow me to analyze black homicide victimizations, a group of students that are 
expulsed and suspended at a higher rate than their white counterparts. Table 13 presents the 
results using the difference-in-differences methodology, and the overall picture seems to be that 
alternative education mandate has no discernible impact on juvenile homicide victimizations.  In 
contrast to homicide offending, with respect to race, I find no impact of the state mandate on 
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juvenile homicide victimizations for African-Americans aged 15-17, despite the fact that it is 
well documented that African-American students are subject to expulsion more than any other 
race. Column (2) of Table 12 reports the results for homicide victimizations of black youth, and 
they show no significant impact for that group, even though the point estimate is negative.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 13 show that these results are not sensitive to a set of state-specific 
linear time trends. 
Investigating the dynamic effect of the state mandate using a series of dummy indicators 
three years before and after the state mandate took went into effect, the results are not significant 
for any the three age groups. Columns (1) through (4) of   Table 14 present the results controlling 
for a rich set of economic and demographic variables, along with state specific linear time trends. 
The signs of most of the point estimates for the dummy indicators after the state mandate went 
into effect are negative; with a small impact on all youth three years after the policy went into 
effect. Overall, using the state homicide victimization and homicide offending data, the findings 
of this section are in line with the earlier set of findings for total crime, total violent crime and 
total property crime using the county level juvenile arrest data in the sense that most of the point 
estimates are negative. However, a significant effect persists only for the state homicide 
offending rates of African-Americans between the ages of 12 and 17.   
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion  
The aim of this paper has been to examine the impact of state-mandated alternative 
education programs for expelled and suspended students on juvenile crime. Given that there are 
several channels through which those programs can impact juvenile crime, we need to exercise 
caution in interpreting the results. Overall, I have found the state mandate to have no impact on 
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juvenile arrest rates for total crime, property crime and violent crime at the county level in the 
U.S.  Notwithstanding issues of measurement error with county level crime data in general, as 
Weiner, Lutz and Ludwig (2009) have argued, among others, therefore, this set of findings is in 
line with the theoretical models of social interaction of crime, implying that the insignificance of 
the results using the county-level data is largely due to the fact that most students might 
misbehave in the classroom in the company their peers, but no longer to do so once removed 
from the school environment. This line of argument would seem to lend support to critics of 
school suspension and expulsion practices, arguing that many of the students who are expelled 
and suspended from schools are not really criminals, as they are often suspended and expelled 
from school for minor school infractions.  
However, state level data on juvenile homicide victimizations and offending seem to, by 
and large, confirm the results, as most of the point estimates have the same signs. However, with 
respect to heterogeneous treatment in terms of race, using an event study methodology and 
controlling for state specific time trends, one and two years after the implementation of state-
mandated alternative education programs, homicide offending rates for African-Americans 
between the ages of 12 and 17 significantly decrease. This might be due to the fact that it has 
been well documented that black students are suspended and expelled from schools at a higher 
rate compared to their white counterparts. 
In light of these findings, it might be useful to perform a cost-benefit analysis of these 
programs. Unfortunately, however, there is very limited information regarding the costs of 
alternative education programs. To obtain any information on the relative size of alternative 
education programs would require contacting separately school districts or school systems in the 
states where those programs are in place. This is not a possible undertaking of the current study, 
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but anecdotal evidence would seem to suggest that students do enroll in these programs. 
Moreover, the school suspension and expulsion crisis is so dire that the federal government, 
through the Departments of Justice and Education, had to intervene in January 2014, outlining 
steps states can take to lessen the impact of the crisis. As the New York Times reports on January 
8, 2014, “The secretary of education, Arne Duncan, and the attorney general, Eric H. Holder Jr., 
released a 35-page document that outlined approaches — including counseling for students, 
coaching for teachers and disciplinary officers, and sessions to teach social and emotional skills 
— that could reduce the time students spend out of school as punishment.” Given the importance 
of this issue, should they fail to make steps to ensure that expelled and suspended students are 
enrolled in those programs, schools systems or school districts in states that mandate alternative 
education programs could be subject to lawsuits from education-related interest groups. 
School suspension and expulsion continue to plague the nation. Newspaper editorials and 
education-related interest groups often raise the issues of harsh consequences of school 
punishment practices, which, as they have argued, often lead to the so-called movement from 
school to the prison pipeline, whereby suspended and expelled students find themselves 
entangled in the juvenile justice system.  This is so much so that, as recently as January 2014, the 
U.S. Departments of Justice and Education outlined steps that states should take to reduce time 
students spend out of school as punishment. This research contributes to the current policy 
debate on school suspension and therefore has far-reaching policy implications.  
 One potential limitation of this study is that I had to track out-of-school suspension laws 
by e-mails from all the 50 states. Even though I have heard from all the states, I could not, 
unfortunately, get much information on the number of students that are actually enrolled in those 
programs, given that most of those programs are administered at the school district level. 
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Therefore, gathering such information about these programs is time-consuming and beyond the 
scope of this study. Another potential limitation of this study is that I have not taken into account 
drug-related crimes that are likely to be committed by juveniles or other less desirable behavior 
such alcohol drinking, cigarette smoking, gambling. 
To conclude, in light of the findings of this study and the importance of school 
suspension and school expulsion in the U.S., further research can extend this paper in several 
ways. One next step might be to investigate the effect of alternative education programs for 
expelled and suspended students on human capital accumulation such as high school completion, 
school dropout and academic achievement. Another policy-relevant step might be to investigate 
whether or not state-mandated alternative-education programs for expelled and suspended 
students have any effect on juvenile incarceration or other juvenile criminal activities. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this dissertation, I have examined three issues in economics that are linked by their 
policy implications. This first chapter investigates the fiscal incidence of direct democracy in the 
American states from 1984 to 2005. From 1898 to 1992, twenty-four U.S. states adopted the 
statewide initiative, allowing citizens to directly influence policy outcomes.  Though an 
extensive empirical literature on the policy outcomes of this political institution exists, 
theoretically, however, how this political institution impacts inequality and redistribution is still 
being sorted out. Overall, I have found the adoption of the statewide initiative to lead to an 
increase in income inequality and a decrease in state tax burden. However, there is no significant 
effect of direct democracy on tax progressivity and only a modest effect on expenditure 
redistribution.  Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using a Correlated Random Effects 
model, direct democracy appears to have led to an increase in marginal and average state tax 
rates, with only modest effects on expenditure redistribution and state tax burden. 
The second chapter examines the extent to which fiscal spillovers exist in county 
governments in California. At the county level in California, each year, quite a number fiscal 
decisions are made through the use of tax and expenditure referenda. A rather large theoretical 
literature has hypothesized that government expenditures and revenues of neighboring 
jurisdictions are interdependent. That is, neighboring jurisdictions incorporate their neighbors’ 
fiscal decisions into their own choices. Using spatial econometric analysis, I have found 
significant fiscal spillover effects in general, public protection, and public facilities expenditures 
and sales, transient and other tax revenues. Overall, the findings of the second chapter are largely 
in line with a host of empirical studies both within and outside of the U.S. investigating the 
extent of strategic interactions across jurisdictions. 
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The third chapter examines the impact of state-mandated alternative education programs 
for expelled and suspended students on juvenile crime.  From 1987 to 2010, fourteen states 
adopted policies designed to reduce time students spend out of school as punishment by 
mandating that school districts establish alternative education programs to serve expelled and 
suspended students.  The Gun-Free School Zones Act (1994), passed by congress to prevent gun 
violence in schools, has led school districts to implement various zero tolerance policy laws, 
allowing schools to expulse and suspend students for various school violations, even for first-
time and minor school transgressions. I estimate the impact of the state mandate on juvenile 
crime, finding that state-level juvenile homicide offending rates for back youth aged 12-17 
significantly decrease after the implementation of those programs. 
This finding is more likely to be due to the incapacitation and human capital 
accumulation effects of state-mandated alternative programs. Given the importance of this issue, 
future research might expand on this study by using alternative methodological approaches to 
check the robustness of the findings.  Also, one hopes that policy makers charged with reforming 
the education systems in the U.S. find something useful in the third essay. 
On the whole, the findings of this dissertation present an interesting depiction of the 
effects of democratic institutions on policy outcomes.  Issues addressed here such as income 
inequality and redistribution are likely to be of importance in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it 
is crucial that future works in political economy deepen our understanding on the mechanisms 
through which direct democracy impacts policy outcomes. 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for state panel data, 1984-2005 
   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Initiative  0.45 0.5 
State government  ideology index 51.76 21.1 
Averaged number of voter initiatives placed on the ballot 3.41 3.3 
Approval rate of voter initiatives 0.49 0.37 
Population density (selected years, people per k𝑚2) 176.51 241.73 
Signature requirement 7.52 2.84 
Qualification difficulty index 5.13 1.96 
Legislative insulation index 4.17 1.76 
Atkinson index 0.234 0.037 
Gini index 0.566 0.038 
Theil index 0.678 0.187 
Top 10% of income earners 0.393 0.056 
Top 1% of income earners 0.145 0.047 
Share of the  democratic votes received by the state 
governor in the last election 0.499 0.11 
Governor’s party is in control of the senate (dummy=1) 0.502 0.494 
Proportion of the population ages 5-17 0.188 0.016 
Proportion of the population ages 5-17 0.124 0.02 
Median age 34.06 2.53 
Median income  50407.63 8381.553 
Income per capita  22748.26 7197.456 
Unemployment rate 5.488 1.707 
Share of democratic house representatives 0.62 0.481 
Share of democratic senators 0.574 0.489 
ln(Population) 14.511 0.938 
Education (share of total  expenditures) 0.324 0.061 
Public welfare (share of total  expenditures) 0.189 0.055 
Hospital (share of total  expenditures) 0.0334 0.018 
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Health (share of total  expenditures) 0.033 0.011 
Region=North 0.18 0.384362 
Region=Midwest 0.26 0.44 
Region=West 0.24 0.43 
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Table 1.2: Direct Democracy on Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public Welfare Hospital Health 
     
Initiative -0.005 -0.007 -0.008** 0.006* 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
R-squared 0.590 0.680 0.367 0.205 
 
Notes: Demographic controls include the fraction of the state population between the 
ages of 5 and 17, old and over 65 and total state population. Controls for economic 
conditions include the unemployment rate, poverty rate, state minimum wage, median 
and per-capita income, intergovernmental revenues. Controls for the political process 
includes state ideology, dummy indicators for the party that is in control of the state 
senate, state house of representatives and whether the state governor is form the 
Democratic Party. Regional dummies for South, Midwest and West (North is 
excluded) and Year FE are excluded. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 1.3: Direct Democracy on Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public Welfare Hospital Health 
     
Initiative -0.013 -0.032** -0.008 0.006 
 (0.025)       (0.016)     (0.008)               (0.005) 
 
     
Difficulty index Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Insulation index Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
R-squared 0.608 0.694 0.380 0.205 
 
                Notes: See Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.4: Direct Democracy on Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public Welfare Hospital Health 
     
Initiative -0.002 -0.017 -0.011** 0.003 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
Controls No No No No 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
 
R-squared 0.024 0.324 0.159 0.055 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5:  Direct Democracy on Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public 
Welfare 
Hospital Health 
     
Initiative 0.026 -0.020 -0.008* 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
South  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Controls No No No No 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
 
R-squared 0.233 0.328 0.185 0.057 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.6: Direct Democracy on Expenditure Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public 
Welfare 
Hospital Health 
     
initiative -0.026*** 0.006 0.005 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) 
ideology 0.0001 0.0002 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gov. revenues -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
poverty -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
minimum wage -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0016 -0.0001 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(population) -0.023 0.132*** 0.049** 0.005 
 (0.107) (0.049) (0.021) (0.022) 
unemployment -0.004** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
income per capita 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old 0.324 -0.085 0.108 0.248 
 (0.428) (0.415) (0.126) (0.153) 
young 0.571** -0.334 -0.110* 0.064 
 (0.232) (0.242) (0.063) (0.075) 
governor’s party -0.010 -0.001 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
house democrat 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.009) (0.007) 
senate democrat 0.027 -0.042** -0.006 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006) 
revenuebar 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
populationbar 0.092 -0.086 -0.034 -0.003 
 (0.112) (0.055) (0.022) (0.023) 
unemploymentbar -0.013** -0.002 -0.005* 0.0004 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
incpercapbar -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medianincomebar -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar -0.505 -0.520 0.067 -0.157 
 (0.721) (0.625) (0.289) (0.202) 
youngbar 0.902 -0.239 0.688* -0.419** 
 (0.870) (0.783) (0.409) (0.191) 
govpartybar 0.071** -0.046 -0.008 -0.017** 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.019) (0.008) 
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hsdembar -0.137* 0.112 0.037 -0.027 
 (0.077) (0.084) (0.026) (0.026) 
sendembar 0.121 -0.079 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.077) (0.071) (0.035) (0.021) 
ideologybar -0.0002 0.001 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
wagebar -0.006 0.011 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.362 0.363 -0.187 0.055 
 (0.259) (0.258) (0.135) (0.070) 
     
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of id 49 49 49 49 
Al regressions includes year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values of 
the additional control variables (means of the time-varying variables) from 
specifications (1) though (4) are, respectively, 0.00, 0.37, 0.00, and 0.27. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7: Direct Democracy on Expenditure Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public Welfare Hospital Health 
     
initiative -0.040*** 0.010 0.007** -0.0003 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
difficulty index 0.008*** -0.002 -0.003*** 0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
poverty -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0016 -0.0001 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
ideology 0.0001 0.0002 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gov. revenues -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) -0.025 0.132*** 0.049** 0.005 
 (0.108) (0.050) (0.021) (0.022) 
unemployment -0.004** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
per capita income 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old 0.292 -0.078 0.114 0.241 
 (0.426) (0.414) (0.127) (0.154) 
young 0.559** -0.332 -0.107* 0.061 
 (0.231) (0.243) (0.063) (0.076) 
governor’s party -0.010 -0.001 0.0004 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
house democrat 0.021 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.009) (0.007) 
senate democrat 0.026 -0.042** -0.006 0.009 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006) 
intrevbar 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logpopbar 0.089 -0.085 -0.033 -0.004 
 (0.113) (0.055) (0.022) (0.023) 
unemplbar -0.013** -0.002 -0.005* 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
incpercapbar -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar -0.614 -0.501 0.122 -0.176 
 (0.667) (0.627) (0.275) (0.203) 
youngbar 0.679 -0.200 0.809** -0.457** 
 (0.772) (0.781) (0.391) (0.196) 
govpartybar 0.051 -0.042 0.001 -0.021*** 
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 (0.036) (0.031) (0.016) (0.008) 
hsdembar -0.138* 0.112 0.039 -0.027 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.026) (0.026) 
sendembar 0.098 -0.075 -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.073) (0.071) (0.035) (0.019) 
ideologybar 0.001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
wagebar -0.024* 0.014 0.006 -0.008* 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 0.499** 0.337 -0.242* 0.079 
 (0.238) (0.262) (0.124) (0.074) 
     
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of id 49 49 49 49 
All specifications include year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values 
for the additional control variables (means of time varying variables) from 
specification (1) through (4) are, respectively, 0.00, 0.37, 0.00, and 0.16. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.8: Direct Democracy on Expenditure Redistribution, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Education Public Welfare Hospital Health 
     
initiative -0.037*** 0.008 0.010* -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) 
difficulty index 0.017*** -0.003 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
insulation index -0.013** 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
poverty -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage -0.001 -0.0001 0.002 -0.0001 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
ideology 0.0001 0.0002 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gov. revenues  -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) -0.024 0.132*** 0.049** 0.005 
 (0.108) (0.050) (0.021) (0.022) 
unemployment -0.004** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
per capita income 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old 0.299 -0.079 0.114 0.240 
 (0.427) (0.414) (0.127) (0.154) 
young 0.561** -0.332 -0.108* 0.061 
 (0.231) (0.243) (0.063) (0.076) 
governor’s party -0.010 -0.001 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
house democrat 0.021 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.009) (0.007) 
senate democrat 0.026 -0.042** -0.006 0.009 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006) 
intrevbar 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
populationbar 0.096 -0.086 -0.034 -0.005 
 (0.111) (0.054) (0.022) (0.023) 
unemplomentbar -0.013** -0.002 -0.005* 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
incpercapbar -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar -0.810 -0.467 0.151 -0.157 
 (0.662) (0.642) (0.275) (0.205) 
youngbar 0.615 -0.188 0.816** -0.451** 
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 (0.728) (0.785) (0.389) (0.198) 
govpartybar 0.042 -0.040 0.003 -0.020** 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.016) (0.008) 
hsdembar -0.170*** 0.118 0.043* -0.024 
 (0.060) (0.080) (0.026) (0.026) 
sendembar 0.143** -0.082 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.035) (0.018) 
ideologybar 0.001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0004* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar -0.008* -0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
wagebar -0.026** 0.014 0.006 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 0.574*** 0.324 -0.253** 0.072 
 (0.215) (0.264) (0.126) (0.074) 
     
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of id 49 49 49 49 
All specifications control for year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-
values for the additional control variables (means of time varying 
variables) are, respectively, 0.00, 0.36, 0.00 and 0.27. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90 
 
 
Table 1.9:  Direct Democracy on Tax Progressivity, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Marginal 
Tax Rate 
Marginal Tax 
Rate 
Marginal 
Tax Rate 
Average Tax 
Rate 
Average 
Tax Rate 
Average Tax 
Rate 
       
Initiative -0.0089 -0.009 -0.0089 -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0044 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Signature No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
Insulation No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Difficulty No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
R-squared 0.232 0.232 0.233 0.225 0.225 0.227 
 
 
Notes: Demographic controls include the fraction of the state population between the ages of 5 and 17, 
over 65 and total state population. Controls for economic conditions include the unemployment rate, 
poverty rate, state minimum wage, median income and per-capita income, intergovernmental 
revenues. Controls for the political process includes state ideology, dummy indicators for the party 
that is in control of the state senate, state house of representatives and whether the state governor is 
form the Democratic Party. Regional dummies for South, Midwest and West (North is excluded) and 
Year FE are excluded. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.10:  Direct Democracy on Tax Progressivity, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Marginal 
Tax Rate 
Marginal Tax 
Rate 
Average Tax 
Rate 
Average Tax 
Rate 
     
Initiative -0.0335 -0.0224 -0.0259 -0.0169 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) 
 
Tax measure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Tax measure+ No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 506 506 506 506 
 
R-squared 0.593 0.552 0.739 0.690 
           
                   Notes: See Table 1.7. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.11: Direct Democracy on Tax Progressivity, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Marginal 
Tax Rate 
Marginal 
Tax Rate 
Average 
Tax Rate 
Average 
Tax Rate 
     
Initiative -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
 
Controls No No No No 
     
South (dummy) No Yes No Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
 
R-squared 0.016 0.034 0.033 0.036 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.12: Direct Democracy on Marginal Tax Rate, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
       
initiative -0.009 -0.015 -0.033*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ideology 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
poverty -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
gov. revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) 0.014 0.013 0.005 -0.046* -0.046* -0.046* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
unemployment -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gdp per capita -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old 0.042 0.029 0.113 -0.164 -0.164 -0.165 
 (0.228) (0.221) (0.153) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
young 0.077 0.079 0.197 0.037 0.037 0.037 
 (0.236) (0.231) (0.204) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
governor’s party -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
house democrat -0.012 -0.010 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
senate democrat 0.047* 0.046* 0.018 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
revenuesbar    -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
populationbar    0.068*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
unemployment 
bar 
   -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
incpercapbar    -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar    0.000 0.000 0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar    0.218 0.239 0.416 
    (0.363) (0.357) (0.321) 
youngbar    -0.122 -0.075 -0.036 
    (0.403) (0.389) (0.365) 
govpartybar    -0.012 -0.009 -0.001 
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    (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) 
hsdembar    -0.071 -0.070 -0.041 
    (0.056) (0.056) (0.051) 
sendembar    0.077 0.081 0.037 
    (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) 
ideologybar    0.001* 0.001 0.001 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
povertybar    0.002 0.002 0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
wagebar    -0.002 0.001 0.003 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
difficulty index  0.001 -0.008***  -0.001 -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.003) 
insulation index   0.016***   0.012*** 
   (0.003)   (0.004) 
Constant -0.017 -0.005 -0.026 0.001 -0.018 -0.091 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.066) (0.146) (0.141) (0.123) 
       
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.232 0.236 0.380    
Number of id    49 49 49 
All specifications control for year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values for the 
significance of the additional control variables (means of time varying variables) for 
specifications (4) through (6) are, respectively, 0.00, 0.00 and 0.00. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.13:  Direct Democracy on Average Tax Rate, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
       
initiative -0.004 -0.007 -0.020*** 0.0031** 0.0034** 0.0027* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
ideology 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
poverty -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
intrev -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logpop 0.011** 0.010* 0.005 -0.041*** -0.041** -0.041** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
unempl -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
incpercap -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medinc 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old 0.026 0.020 0.079 -0.137** -0.137** -0.138** 
 (0.160) (0.158) (0.105) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
young -0.0003 0.0004 0.083 0.028 0.028 0.027 
 (0.158) (0.155) (0.138) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
governor’s party -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
hsdem -0.001 0.0001 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
sendem 0.025 0.025 0.005 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
intrevbar    -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logpopbar    0.057*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
unemplbar    -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
incpercapbar    -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar    0.000 0.000 0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar    0.175 0.190 0.326 
    (0.258) (0.254) (0.220) 
youngbar    -0.074 -0.042 -0.009 
    (0.266) (0.257) (0.235) 
govpartybar    -0.002 0.001 0.007 
    (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
hsdembar    -0.025 -0.025 -0.002 
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    (0.037) (0.037) (0.031) 
sendembar    0.044 0.047 0.014 
    (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) 
ideologybar    0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar    0.0004 0.0003 0.002 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
wagebar    0.0003 0.002 0.004 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
difficulty index   0.001 -0.006***  -0.001 -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
insulation index   0.011***   0.009*** 
   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Constant -0.013 -0.008 -0.022 -0.014 -0.027 -0.082 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.044) (0.101) (0.097) (0.081) 
       
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.225 0.227 0.409    
Number of id    49 49 49 
All specifications control for year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values for the 
additional controls (means of time varying variables) from specifications (4) though (6) 
are, respectively, 0.00, 0.00 and 0.00. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.14: Direct Democracy on Tax Burden, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Initiative -0.0398** -0.0409** -0.041** -0.184** -0.215*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.069) (0.074) 
 
Tax measure No No No Yes Yes 
 
Tax measure+ No No No No Yes 
 
Signature 
requirement 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Insulation 
index 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Difficulty 
index 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 506 506 
 
R-squared 0.754 0.754 0.755 0.838 0.855 
 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithmic of state tax burden. Demographic 
controls include the fraction of the state population between the ages of 5 and 17, over 
65 and total state population. Controls for economic conditions include the 
unemployment rate, poverty rate, state minimum wage, median income and per-capita 
income, intergovernmental revenues. Controls for the political process includes state 
ideology, dummy indicators for the party that is in control of the state senate, state house 
of representatives and whether the state governor is form the Democratic Party. Regional 
dummies for South, Midwest and West (North is excluded) and Year FE are excluded. 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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                            Table 1.15:  Direct Democracy on Tax Burden, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Initiative -0.052 -0.101*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
 
Tax measure No No No Yes 
     
Tax measure+ No No Yes Yes 
     
South No Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
 
R-squared 0.184 0.317 0.324 0.326 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithmic of state tax burden. No control 
variables are included in any of the specifications.  All specifications include Year 
fixed-effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.16: Direct Democracy on State Tax Burden, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 CRE1 CRE2 CRE3 
       
initiative -0.040** -0.104*** -0.135*** 0.003 0.002 0.0001 
 (0.019) (0.036) (0.038) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
ideology 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gov. revenues -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.114*** -0.084 -0.084 -0.085 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) 
unemployment -0.009 -0.010 -0.009* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
per capita income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old 1.251* 1.105* 1.238** -1.827*** -1.830*** -1.834*** 
 (0.679) (0.608) (0.507) (0.692) (0.694) (0.694) 
young -0.212 -0.269 -0.068 -0.930** -0.931** -0.932** 
 (0.964) (0.884) (0.851) (0.449) (0.449) (0.450) 
governor’s party -0.052** -0.053** -0.047** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
house democrat 0.005 0.024 0.060 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.070) (0.066) (0.059) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
senate democrat -0.001 -0.030 -0.076 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.068) (0.063) (0.062) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
intrevbar    -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
populationbar    0.245*** 0.245*** 0.238*** 
    (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) 
unemploymentbar    -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
incpercapbar    -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar    0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar    3.718*** 3.694*** 3.879*** 
    (1.398) (1.382) (1.364) 
youngbar    0.972 0.919 0.968 
    (1.168) (1.165) (1.179) 
govpartybar    -0.060 -0.064 -0.056 
    (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) 
hsdembar    -0.008 -0.008 0.022 
    (0.134) (0.134) (0.127) 
sendembar    -0.138 -0.143 -0.187 
    (0.178) (0.178) (0.170) 
ideologybar    0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
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    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
povertybar    0.007 0.007 0.009 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
wagebar    -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
difficulty index  0.013** -0.002  0.001 -0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
insulation index   0.027***   0.012 
   (0.009)   (0.010) 
Constant 2.453*** 2.552*** 2.521*** 2.126*** 2.151*** 2.077*** 
 (0.293) (0.273) (0.254) (0.430) (0.430) (0.421) 
       
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.754 0.772 0.786    
Number of id    49 49 49 
All specifications include year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values for the 
additional control variables (means of time varying variables) are, respectively, 0.00, 0.00 
and 0.00. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.17: Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
Initiative 0.005 0.012** 0.037* 0.009** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
 
R-squared 0.879 0.664 0.818 0.848 0.730 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithmic of state tax burdens. Demographic 
controls include the fraction of the state population that is 5-17 years old and over 65 
and total state population. Controls for economic conditions include the unemployment 
rate, poverty rate, state minimum wage, median income and per-capita income, 
intergovernmental revenues. Controls for the political process includes state ideology, 
dummy indicators for the party that is in control of the state senate, state house of 
representatives and whether the state governor is form the Democratic Party. Regional 
dummies for South, Midwest and West (North is excluded) and Year FE are excluded. 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.18:  Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
Initiative 0.006* 0.012** 0.039* 0.008* 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
 
Tax measure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
 
R-squared 0.879 0.664 0.818 0.848 0.731 
 
               Notes: See Table 1.12. 
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Table 1.19:  Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
Initiative 0.006* 0.012** 0.038* 0.008* 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
Tax measure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
Tax measure+ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
      
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
 
R-squared 0.879 0.665 0.819 0.849 0.733 
  
              Notes: See Table 1.12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.20: Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
Initiative -0.0002 0.014** 0.012 0.014 0.017 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.036) (0.013) (0.012) 
 
Controls No No No No No 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
 
R-squared 0.566 0.490 0.435 0.348 0.303 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.21:  Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
Initiative 0.005 0.012** 0.037* 0.008** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
South Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Controls No No No No No 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
 
R-squared 0.879 0.664 0.818 0.848 0.730 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.22: Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
initiative 0.002 0.002 0.020* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) 
ideology -0.000 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
poverty 0.0003 0.001* 0.0002 0.0002 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage -0.002 -0.006** -0.006 -0.002 -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.002) 
gov. revenues 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) 0.086*** 0.036 0.514*** 0.086*** 0.110*** 
 (0.019) (0.040) (0.120) (0.023) (0.030) 
unemployment -0.003*** 0.0002 -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
per capita income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old -0.053 -0.278 -0.463 0.004 0.291 
 (0.297) (0.425) (1.977) (0.321) (0.354) 
young 0.036 -0.244* -0.920 -0.031 -0.337* 
 (0.162) (0.127) (0.984) (0.161) (0.195) 
governor’s party -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0024 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
house democrat 0.015 0.011 0.080 0.011 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.061) (0.012) (0.014) 
senate democrat 0.008 -0.005 0.095* 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.052) (0.009) (0.012) 
intrevbar 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
populationbar -0.079*** -0.050 -0.467*** -0.078*** -0.103*** 
 (0.019) (0.041) (0.130) (0.022) (0.032) 
unemploymentbar 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
incpercapbar 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar 0.058 0.365 0.649 0.037 -0.294 
 (0.395) (0.500) (2.575) (0.469) (0.467) 
youngbar 0.415 1.255*** 3.195 0.541 0.772* 
 (0.322) (0.291) (2.097) (0.349) (0.397) 
govpartybar 0.001 0.010 0.024 0.009 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.060) (0.013) (0.011) 
hsdembar 0.016 0.025 0.152 0.034 0.035 
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 (0.034) (0.033) (0.226) (0.041) (0.045) 
sendembar -0.029 -0.035 -0.205 -0.037 -0.003 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.172) (0.032) (0.034) 
ideologybar -0.0004 -0.001* -0.002 -0.001* -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.003* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
wagebar 0.004 0.014** 0.006 0.007* 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.012 0.163 -0.432 0.110 0.065 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.683) (0.130) (0.129) 
      
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of id 49 49 49 49 49 
All specifications control for year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values for 
the additional control variables are, respectively, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00 and 0.00.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.23: Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
initiative 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) 
difficulty index 0.0003 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
ideology -0.000 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
poverty 0.0003 0.001* 0.0002 0.0002 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage -0.002 -0.006** -0.006 -0.002 -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.002) 
gov. revenues 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) 0.085*** 0.036 0.513*** 0.085*** 0.110*** 
 (0.019) (0.041) (0.120) (0.023) (0.031) 
unemployment -0.003*** 0.0002 -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
per capita income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old -0.055 -0.281 -0.467 -0.0003 0.287 
 (0.298) (0.423) (1.982) (0.322) (0.355) 
young 0.036 -0.245* -0.921 -0.032 -0.338* 
 (0.162) (0.127) (0.984) (0.161) (0.195) 
governor’s party -0.0004 -0.0003 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
house democrat 0.015 0.011 0.079 0.011 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.062) (0.012) (0.014) 
senate democrat 0.008 -0.005 0.095* 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.052) (0.009) (0.012) 
intrevbar 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logpopbar -0.079*** -0.050 -0.468*** -0.078*** -0.103*** 
 (0.019) (0.041) (0.131) (0.022) (0.032) 
unemplbar 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004*** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
incpercapbar 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar 0.055 0.363 0.640 0.027 -0.298 
 (0.396) (0.503) (2.574) (0.469) (0.469) 
youngbar 0.409 1.252*** 3.177 0.521 0.765* 
 (0.324) (0.293) (2.111) (0.351) (0.399) 
govpartybar 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.007 0.005 
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 (0.009) (0.012) (0.057) (0.012) (0.011) 
hsdembar 0.016 0.026 0.152 0.034 0.036 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.226) (0.041) (0.045) 
sendembar -0.030 -0.036 -0.207 -0.039 -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.172) (0.032) (0.034) 
ideologybar -0.0003 -0.001* -0.002 -0.001 -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.003* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
wagebar 0.003 0.013** 0.004 0.005 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.021) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.017 0.170 -0.420 0.124 0.075 
 (0.105) (0.109) (0.688) (0.132) (0.131) 
      
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of id 49 49 49 49 49 
All specifications control for year FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values 
for the additional control variables (means of time varying variables) are, 
respectively, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00 and 0.00.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.24: Direct Democracy on Income Inequality, 1984-2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Atkinson Gini Theil Top 10% Top 1% 
      
initiative 0.003 0.003 0.029* 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) 
difficulty index 0.005*** 0.003 0.028*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
insulation index -0.006*** -0.004 -0.038*** -0.006*** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) 
poverty 0.0003 0.001* 0.0002 0.0002 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage -0.002 -0.006** -0.006 -0.002 -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.002) 
ideology -0.000 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gov. revenues 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(population) 0.086*** 0.036 0.515*** 0.086*** 0.110*** 
 (0.019) (0.041) (0.119) (0.023) (0.030) 
unemployment -0.003*** 0.0002 -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
per capita income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
median income -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
old -0.050 -0.276 -0.442 0.004 0.293 
 (0.298) (0.423) (1.985) (0.322) (0.356) 
young 0.037 -0.243* -0.912 -0.031 -0.336* 
 (0.163) (0.127) (0.986) (0.161) (0.195) 
governor’s party -0.0002 -0.0002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
house democrat 0.016 0.011 0.081 0.011 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.062) (0.012) (0.014) 
senate democrat 0.008 -0.005 0.096* 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.052) (0.009) (0.012) 
revenubar 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
populationbar -0.076*** -0.048 -0.448*** -0.075*** -0.100*** 
 (0.019) (0.041) (0.128) (0.023) (0.031) 
unemploymentbar 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
incpercapbar 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
medincbar -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
oldbar -0.042 0.301 0.058 -0.068 -0.390 
 (0.380) (0.480) (2.523) (0.454) (0.463) 
youngbar 0.373 1.222*** 2.981 0.489 0.726* 
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 (0.290) (0.288) (1.921) (0.323) (0.380) 
govpartybar -0.001 0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.057) (0.012) (0.011) 
hsdembar -0.0002 0.016 0.056 0.018 0.021 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.181) (0.033) (0.037) 
sendembar -0.008 -0.023 -0.073 -0.018 0.016 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.129) (0.024) (0.027) 
ideologybar -0.0002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
povertybar -0.0001 0.003* -0.004 0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
wagebar 0.002 0.013** -0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.053 0.190** -0.199 0.159 0.107 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.603) (0.117) (0.121) 
      
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Number of id 49 49 49 49 49 
All specifications control for state FE and regional dummies. The joint p-values for the 
additional control variables (means of time varying variables) are, respectively, 0.00, 
0.00, 0.00, 0.00 and 0.00. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109 
 
Table 2.1:  County statistics  
Variable  Mean Standard 
   Deviation 
Population  667018.4 1604164 
  African-American                                  .0351        0.0.53 
White  .643 0.206 
Asian  .046 .0511 
Hispanic  .264 .1811 
Share of Democratic registered voters  0.40 .078 
Under poverty (%)   15.034 5.08 
Median income  47656.74 12937.7 
Per capita income  35690 12709 
Unemployment rate  9.387 4.200 
Sales tax revenues  326.776 2172.375 
Transient tax revenues  261.99 1689.035 
Other tax revenues  660.213 11067.66 
General expenditures  2725.492 29181.53 
Public protection expenditures  10815.13 149519.5 
Public facilities expenditures  1325.517 10461.37 
Public assistance expenditures  11046.93 164729.5 
Health expenditures  6313.898 84123.17 
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Table 2.2: General Expenditures, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
0.478*** 0.623** 
 (0.149) (0.274) 
 
 
0.289** 0.277** 
 (0.113) (0.117) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
                 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithmic of general expenditures. 
Control variables include the share of registered voters that is democrat, the 
share of the population that is white, African-American, Asian and Hispanic, 
total county population, % of county population under poverty, median income, 
per capita income and unemployment rate. Standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.3: Public Protection Expenditures, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
0.371*** 0.084 
 (0.067) (0.180) 
 
 
0.584*** 0.638*** 
 (0.076) (0.079) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
 
                                   Notes: See Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.4: Public Facilities Expenditures, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Public Facilities Facilities 
   
 
0.673*** 0.481** 
 (0.170) (0.189) 
 
 
0.299** 0.283** 
 (0.140) (0.121) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
             
                     Notes: See Table 2.2. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5: Public Assistance Expenditures, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
1.143*** 0.264 
 (0.236) (0.243) 
 
 
-0.168 -0.186 
 (0.236) (0.148) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
 
                      Notes: See Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.6: Health Expenditures, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
0.712*** 0.874*** 
 (0.117) (0.261) 
 
 
0.183 0.088 
 (0.140) (0.135) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
  
                                  Notes: See Table 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Sales Tax Revenues, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
0.196*** 0.842*** 
 (0.072) (0.235) 
 
 
0.676*** 0.363*** 
 (0.080) (0.136) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
                    
                                 Notes: See Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.8: License Tax Revenues, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
0.162 0.529** 
 (0.145) (0.231) 
 
 
0.529*** 0.351** 
 (0.126) (0.166) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
               
                         Notes: See Table 2.2. 
 
 
 
Table 2.9: Other Tax Revenues, 2003-2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
 
0.445*** 0.459*** 
 (0.108) (0.100) 
 
 0.556*** 0.192** 
 (0.081) (0.094) 
 
Time trends No Yes 
   
Observations 348 348 
 
Number of county 58 58 
                 
                            Notes: See Table 2.2. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for  county panel data, 1997-2010 
    
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Alternative Education 36222 0.31 0.46 
Total crime 36222 1241.45 4537.06 
Violent crime 36222 158.28 403.17 
Rape 36222 9.7 44.3 
Aggravated assault 36222 115.78 290.17 
Robbery  36222 27.9 119.7 
Murder 36222 2.09 14.56 
Property crime 36222 1081.25 4186.66 
Burglary 36222 237.5 503.74 
Larceny 36222 746.38 3401.54 
Motor vehicle theft 36222 74.8 357.53 
Arson 36222 17.59 87.84 
Coverage indicator 36222 81.07 32.73 
Juvenile population (age 10-17) 36222 10358.62 34333.9 
White population ( age 10-17) 36222 8072.32 25544.73 
Black population (age 10-17) 36222 1621.38 7131.35 
% Under poverty (all ages) 36222 15.02 6.08 
% Under poverty (age 5-17) 36222 19.11 8.36 
Ln (average earnings per job) 36222 4.48 0.12 
Ln (per capita income) 36222 4.42 0.12 
Median income (current $) 36222 37998.85 10220.96 
Unemployment rate 36222 8.232 3.84 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for  state panel data, 1994-2010 
    
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. 
Alternative education 782 0.2 0.4 
Homicide offending (age 12-17) 782 12.24 54.51 
Black Homicide offending (age 12-17) 782 17.44 23.51 
Victim (age 12-14) 782 1.07 1.14 
Victim (age 15-17) 782 5.4 4.74 
Black victim (age 12-14) 782 2.78 5.11 
Black victim (age 15-17) 782 19.23 25.31 
Population  (age 12-17) 782 496621.2 552123.6 
Population  (age 12-14) 782 247897.3 277166.7 
Population (15-17) 782 248723.8 275168.1 
Black population (12-17) 782 79408.28 90295.37 
Black population (12-14) 782 39727.63 45119.88 
Black population (15-17) 782 39680.65 45259.34 
Share of population (5-17) 782 0.19 0.013 
Share of population (over 65) 782 0.124 0.018 
Ln (population) 782 6.54 0.441 
Income per capita 782 27762.5 5675.16 
State minimum wage 782 5.53 1.172 
State poverty rate 782 12.205 3.51 
Median income (current $) 782 52771.44 8184.76 
Gini index 782 0.58 0.03 
Unemployment rate 782 4.841 1.165 
South 782 0.326 0.469 
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Table 3.3: Effect of Alternative Education on Juvenile Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total crime Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Total crime Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
       
Alternative education -542.701 -35.072 -509.451 -109.494 8.833 -121.032 
 (443.193) (33.880) (410.435) (214.444) (15.573) (199.513) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
State trends No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 
R-squared 0.143 0.213 0.141 0.152 0.223 0.149 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual arrest rates per 100,000 of youth aged 10-17. 
Demographic controls:  total county population, white and black youth aged 10-17. Economic controls: 
unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county population under poverty, average earnings per 
jobs, median income and per-capita income. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Effect of Alternative Education on Juvenile Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Total 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
       
Alternative education -0.041 -0.036 -0.043 -0.011 -0.044 -0.024 
 (0.060) (0.054) (0.060) (0.082) (0.058) (0.077) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
State trends No N0 No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 39,533 39,526 39,531 39,533 39,526 39,531 
R-squared 0.547 0.561 0.547 0.575 0.575 0.572 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the logarithmic of a county’s annual arrest rates per 100,000 of 
youth aged 10-17. Demographic controls:  total county population, white and black youth aged 10-17. 
Economic controls:  unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county population under 
poverty, average earnings per job, median income and per-capita income. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 118 
 
Table 3.5: Effect of Alternative Education on Violent Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Rape Aggravated assault Robbery Murder 
     
Alternative education -2.287 -19.414 -12.095 -0.089 
 (1.848) (22.243) (10.663) (0.359) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 
R-squared 0.124 0.210 0.253 0.110 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual violent crime arrest rates per 100,000 of 
youth aged 10-17. Demographic controls: total county population, white and black youth aged 
10-17. Economic controls: unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county population 
under poverty, average earnings per job, median income and per-capita income. Robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Effect of Alternative Education on Property Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Larceny Motor Vehicle Theft Burglary Arson 
     
Alternative education -415.175 -30.297 -53.255 -11.686 
 (323.372) (37.484) (43.717) (8.132) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 
R-squared 0.139 0.144 0.184 0.133 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual property crime arrest rates per 100,000 
of youth aged 10-17. Demographic controls: total county population, white and black youth 
aged 10-17. Economic controls: unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county 
population under the poverty, average earnings per job, median income and per-capita income. 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Dynamic Effect of Alternative Education on Juvenile Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total crime Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
Total crime Violent 
crime 
Property 
crime 
       
-2 -193.474 -31.321* -20.039 -44.906 -19.534* -2.419 
 (212.957) (17.815) (169.361) (128.928) (10.581) (169.344) 
 
-1 -229.798 -28.527 -37.922 -31.051 -7.734 37.334 
 (298.871) (23.411) (217.709) (208.684) (13.900) (223.118) 
 
+1 -309.124 -39.011 -177.986 -181.829 -18.905 -124.221 
 (334.692) (29.113) (225.854) (310.18) (27.106) (265.118) 
 
+2 -215.623 -13.050 -202.350 -206.99 -2.761 -192.864 
 (290.35) (28.828) (260.719) (296.09) (28.54) (284.733) 
 
+3 -252.008 -12.778 -219.311 -105.610 4.379 -99.539 
 (267.355) (22.560) (227.192) (185.905) (16.441) (182.238) 
 
+4 -167.414 -0.339 -69.630 -94.262 16.876 -1.978 
 (281.237) (26.888) (268.712) (248.908) (24.245) (270.340) 
 
+5 -252.995 -7.526 -248.438 270.959 -2.267 -261.581 
 (310.88) (25.294) (285.999) (352.08) (29.43) (317.867) 
 
Economic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Demographic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 121 
 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year Fe Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
State trends N N N Y Y Y 
 
Observations 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 
R-squared 0.143 0.213 0.159 0.152 0.223 0.165 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual arrest rates per 100,000 of youth aged 10-17. 
Demographic controls: total county population, white and black youth aged 10-17. Economic controls:  
unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county population under poverty, average earnings 
per job, median income and per-capita income. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at 
the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Dynamic Effect of Alternative Education on Juvenile Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
Total 
crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Property 
Crime 
       
-2 -0.033 -0.030 -0.030 -0.051 -0.041 -0.047 
 (0.046) (0.040) (0.046) (0.048) (0.036) (0.048) 
 
-1 -0.029 -0.056 -0.022 -0.020 -0.036 -0.013 
 (0.061) (0.034) (0.064) (0.060) (0.028) (0.062) 
 
+1 0.160 -0.006 0.171 0.212 0.056 0.223 
 (0.145) (0.060) (0.137) (0.155) (0.075) (0.150) 
 
+2 0.1540 0.060 0.138 0.153 0.0889 0.134 
 (0.107) (0.066) (0.101) (0.105) (0.054) (0.104) 
 
+3 0.161 0.053 0.153 0.157* 0.082 0.144* 
 (0.103) (0.065) (0.101) (0.083) (0.049) (0.078) 
 
+4 0.1556* 0.10** 0.144* 0.180** 0.141** 0.161* 
 (0.089) (0.048) (0.085) (0.086) (0.061) (0.084) 
 
+5 0.048 -0.007 0.037 0.062 0.025 0.047 
 (0.058) (0.045) (0.061) (0.071) (0.047) (0.074) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Demographic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 123 
 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
State trends No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 39,533 39,526 39,531 39,533 39,526 39,531 
R-squared 0.548 0.561 0.548 0.577 0.575 0.573 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are the log of a county’s annual arrest rates per 100,000 youth aged 
10-17. Demographic controls: county population, black and white youth aged 10-17. Economic 
controls: unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county population under poverty, 
average earnings per job, median income and per-capita income. Robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9: Dynamic Effect of Alternative Education on Property Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Larceny Motor vehicle theft Burglary Arson 
     
-2 -117.268 -10.3037 -42.369* 7.456* 
 (161.410) (17.621) (23.267) (4.369) 
 
-1 -141.379 -11.075 -51.198 -1.702 
 (213.537) (29.027) (33.961) (7.385) 
 
+1 -251.125 -0.286 -5.999 -11.215* 
 (227.239) (39.904) (35.674) (6.043) 
 
+2 -207.385 -6.516 10.513 -0.088 
 (190.612) (25.275) (47.621) (6.400) 
 
+3 -238.489 -13.273 11.809 0.526 
 (188.761) (26.552) (33.442) (5.979) 
 
+4 -154.882 -5.648 -7.272 -2.871 
 (205.146) (22.692) (32.324) (5.243) 
 
+5 -195.125 -17.243 -24.529 -7.861 
 (222.080) (26.930) (31.349) (6.418) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 
R-squared 0.139 0.144 0.184 0.133 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual property crime arrest rates per 100,000 
youth aged 10-17. Demographic controls: total county population, black and white youth aged 
10-17. Economic controls: unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county 
population under poverty, average earnings per job, median income and per-capita income. 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 3.10: Dynamic Effect of Alternative Education on Violent Crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Rape Aggravated assault Robbery Murder 
     
-2 1.899 -17.533 -16.09*** -0.224 
 (1.900) (11.651) (4.988) (0.621) 
 
-1 0.053 -22.158 -10.556* 0.722 
 (2.079) (16.876) (5.786) (0.508) 
 
+1 -1.948 -29.866 -6.799 0.123 
 (2.025) (21.386) (6.028) (0.544) 
 
+2 1.421 -7.759 -5.641 0.450 
 (1.133) (22.381) (5.613) (0.375) 
 
+3 -0.139 -12.252 -0.274 0.541 
 (1.936) (15.397) (6.168) (0.699) 
 
+4 -0.600 2.538 -1.477 0.808* 
 (1.458) (19.189) (7.232) (0.438) 
 
+5 -2.060 -7.737 2.405 0.102 
 (3.387) (16.009) (6.644) (0.260) 
 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Demographic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 39,533 39,533 39,533 39,533 
R-squared 0.124 0.210 0.253 0.110 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a county’s annual violent crime rates per 100,000 youth 
aged 10-17. Demographic controls: total county population, black and white youth aged 10-
17. Economic controls: unemployment rate, % of youth aged 5-17 and total county population 
under poverty, average earnings per job, median income, and per-capita income.  Robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. 11: Alternative Education on Homicide Offending 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Age 12-17 Black Age12-17 Age 12-17 Black Age 12-17 
     
Alternative education 0.610 -9.851 -2.622 -14.705*** 
 (4.277) 
 
(6.854) (1.591) (4.225) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Economic controls              Yes            Yes         Yes      Yes 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
State trends No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 517 510 517 510 
R-squared 0.854 0.471 0.968 0.557 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a state’s annual homicide offending rates per 100,000 of the 
respective at-risk population. Demographic controls include the fraction of the state population 
that is 5-17 years old and over 65. Controls for economic conditions include the unemployment 
rate, Gini index, poverty rate, minimum wage rate, median income and per-capita income. Robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.12:  Dynamic Effect of Alternative Education on Homicide Offending 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Age 12-17 Black Age 12-17 Age 12-17 Black Age 12-17 
     
+1 2.269 -4.363 -0.518 -13.571*** 
 (2.168) 
 
(4.829) (1.758) (2.460) 
+2 -1.192 -12.012*** -3.806 -16.191*** 
 (3.457) 
 
(2.319) (2.633) (3.950) 
+3 -1.970 -5.035 -3.473** -8.052 
 (2.762) 
 
(4.674) (1.714) (5.498) 
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Demographic 
controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
State trends No No Yes Yes 
Observations 517 510 517 510 
 
R-squared 0.854 0.471 0.968 0.559 
 
        Notes: See Table 3.11. 
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Table 3.13: Alternative Education on Homicide Victimizations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Age 15-17 Black Age15-17 Age 15-17 Black Age 15-17 
     
Alternative education -1.642 -4.277 -1.338 -8.735 
 (1.254) (6.552) (0.975) (5.722) 
Economic controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
State trends  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 516 515 516 515 
R-squared 0.765 0.422 0.833 0.506 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are a state’s annual homicide victimization rates per 100,000 
of the respective at-risk population. Demographic controls include the fraction of the state 
population that is 5-17 years old and over 65. Controls for economic conditions include the 
unemployment rate, Gini index, poverty rate, state minimum wage, median income and per-
capita income. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table3.14: Dynamic Effect of Alternative Education on Homicide Victimizations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Age 15-17 Black Age 15-17 Age 15-17 Black Age 15-17 
     
+1 1.166* 3.557 -0.514 -3.818 
 (0.648) (7.352) (0.619) (6.567) 
+2 1.116 -8.971 -0.367 -11.373 
 (1.288) (8.947) (1.715) (7.943) 
+3 -0.199 -1.119 -1.421** -3.074 
 (0.797) (3.381) (0.676) (3.077) 
Economic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State trends No No Yes Yes 
Observations 516 515 516 515 
R-squared 0.764 0.423 0.833 0.507 
 
                Notes: See Table 3.13. 
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